The Scent of Spring

The Persian New Year, Norooz, is around the corner. It is a festive and colorful time. Everything seems a bit softer and more pleasant, albeit fleeting. As the nature begins to turn over a new leaf, families try to embrace the spring among their loved ones. Relatives gather around, exchange gifts, consume delicious food, and recall cherished memories.

One of the most beloved Iranian songs that captures the feeling of Norooz well is Farhad’s Koodakaneh (Childhood). Surprisingly, it’s not the happiest song. It has a strong sense of longing and nostalgia. The singer’s childhood memories help him live through the unforgiving winter while he patiently waits for the warmth of spring. Maybe it’s too far of a stretch to say that the lyrics are reminiscent of the Iranian outlook in general – eternal longing for the past while evading the present – but it certainly strikes a strong chord with many Persian listeners.

The song is one of my personal favorites, so I decided to translate it for all the Iran lovers out there. I wish everyone a wonderful and prosperous New Year. Eide hamegi mobarak!

Scent of eidi (money given to children on New Year)
Scent of cannon*
Scent of confetti
Pungent scent of smoked fish on the new tablecloth
Scent of jasmine in grandmother’s cashmere prayer mat
With these [thoughts], I let winter pass by

The joy of breaking the piggy bank
The horror of losing the eidi coins by counting them too many times
Scent of pressed crisp bills in the book
With these [thoughts], I let winter pass by
With these, I relieve my weariness

Joy of a long leap over lit shrubs
Bright shine of coupled shoes in closets
With these [thoughts], I let the winter pass by
With these, I relieve my weariness

Love of playing alak-dolak
Fear of not finishing the New Year’s school homework
Scent of the dried rose peddles in the book
With these [thoughts], I let winter pass by
With these, I relieve my weariness

Scent of the garden, the pool
Fine fragrance of nazri*
Friday night, following a lantern, getting lost in the alleyway
Lust for a swim in the azure stream,
With these [thoughts], I let winter pass by
With these, I relieve my weariness
With these [thoughts], I let winter pass by
With these, I relieve my weariness

* Traditionally cannon blasts mark the exact moment of the spring equinox, the beginning of the Persian New Year.

* Iranians distribute free food during Ashura and other religious days. The food specifically made for such occasions is called nazri.

Iran's Second Generation Reformists Off to Shaky Start

My latest opinion piece for Al-Monitor discusses the formation of a new Reformist faction called Neda. The faction could be the much-needed impetus for the Reformists’ return to the political arena; however, ranking Reformists remain skeptical. By vowing to get closer to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the group could open some breathing room for Reformists, while at the same time disenfranchising the more radical elements of the Reformist camp.

The nascent group, which announced its decision to officially become a political faction by submitting a request to Iran’s Interior Ministry, consists of a 12-member founding board, under the leadership of Sadegh Kharazi, a seasoned diplomat and adviser to former Reformist President Mohammad Khatami. The majority of members belong to the youth wings of banned Reformist groups such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front, a political faction credited as the most dominant force within the 1997 Iranian Reform Movement, and the Organization of the Mujahedeen of the Islamic Revolution, a small, influential political faction. The prominent members of these groups were arrested and the factions were banned following the disputed 2009 presidential election.

There are many uncertainties surrounding the nature, ideology and ultimate objective of the new political faction. However, Kharazi has made it clear that one of their major objectives is to “play an effective role” in upcoming elections. Tired of the first generation of Reformists’ inaction following the 2009 presidential election, Neda has taken it upon itself to pave the way for the political participation of younger, second-generation Reformists. Read more…

Rouhani Goes to College

My latest opinion piece for The Majalla talks about a tug-of-war taking place between President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate administration and the conservatives over the control of Iran’s universities. I argue that the outcome of the conflict is not certain, but a rejection of the Science Minister’s proposed changes would decrease any hope for short-term improvements in academic freedom in Iran.

One of the biggest disputes between Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate administration and Iran’s conservative factions is centered on the issue of academic freedom. Conservative forces are attempting to stay in control of the country’s educational system, while the moderates are hoping to increase the autonomy of Iran’s universities. The outcome of this conflict will be a litmus test for the level of academic freedom permitted under the current administration.

The regime’s struggle to control academia is not new. Even before the contested 2009 Presidential Election, Iran’s universities were a hotbed of political activity. A series of student protests of July 1999 that began as a peaceful demonstration in Tehran were violently suppressed after six days of demonstrations and riots across the country. The desire to closely monitor and regulate student and faculty activities is therefore logical from the perspective of the country’s political elite, if they want to eliminate the chance of a spark that could result in mass public dissent. Read more…

Zarif's Facebook Message Following a Day of Nuclear Talks

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, posted a Facebook message updating his followers about the progress of the ongoing nuclear negotiation in Vienna.

The sixth and final round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group began yesterday and the deadline for a deal expires on July 20. However, this could be extended if an agreement is not made in time. You may find the translation of Zarif’s message below.

View fullsize

Hello friends,

It’s 5:40 am, Thursday Vienna time (8:10 am Tehran time.) The new round of negotiations began yesterday. Given the complexity and interconnectedness of the numerous issues at hand that need to be collectively agreed on, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the talks. We should not take speculation made by some media sources, especially in the West, too seriously. Instead of delivering the news and analysis, they are attempting to create an atmosphere that could [negatively] impact the negotiations. What I can guarantee is that my colleagues and I will try our hardest in order to achieve a rational and sustainable solution. In this difficult path, we need your support and positive prayers, especially during this holy month [Ramadan.]

Before my departure to Vienna, I sent a video message in English that has now been subtitled in various languages in the virtual space. The link below has the Farsi subtitles.

Iran’s Former Reformist President Khatami: I Do Not Want to Return to Power

Iran’s former reformist president, Mohammad Khatami stated that he has no intention of returning to power and politicians from his generation should follow suit.

“I do not have the intention of returning to power…our generation should not return to power again, but we would like to protect [our] values and standards. We will try to promote individuals to power who are most concerned with regime’s aspirations and goals,” Khatami stated.

Khatami spoke during a meeting with the Association of Iranian Political Prisoners Before the Revolution on June 16. Reformist Sharqh newspaper originally published the statements under the headline “Khatami’s Farewell with Power.”

According to Sharqh, Khatami views himself and other reformists as government critics, but emphasizes that they believe in the “foundations of the regime.”

“We have complaints and criticisms, but we believe in the bases of the regime. We do not want our critiques to harm the foundations of the regime. Unfortunately, there are shortsighted views that summarize the regime with a narrow definition. If anyone speaks against [that narrow definition] they say that the regime was weakened. However, a limited view of the regime is what causes the greatest harm,” Khatami stated.

“We all want for [Rouhani’s] government to succeed. This government has a lot of big problems, but it has also done many good things. There are shortcomings, but a big portion of the problems were inherited from the previous administration. So, instead of creating a new arena, the government’s resources have to be spent on fixing old problems,” Khatami elaborated.

Khatami stated that the Revolution belongs to the entire nation and it is the Iranian people who have paid the price thus far. “A single individual or group cannot suggest that they have monopoly over the Revolution, especially groups that neither in theory or practice were affiliated with the Revolution,” Khatami added.

Hashemi Rafsanjani: There Are No Real Political Parties in Iran

During a speech at the opening ceremony of the fifteenth gathering of the Justice and Freedom Congress of Islamic Iran on April 26, Hashemi Rafsajnai, the Chairman of the Expediency Council, stated that there are no real political parties in the country, but belief in the formation of such entities is prevalent.

“Despite all the trials and errors, we hope to reach a point within our society that would allow political parties to function,” Rafsanajni added.

Formed in 1997 as the Solidarity Association of Followers of Imam’s Path, the organization is the first reformist faction created under the auspices of Khatami’s reformist presidency. Based in Isfahan, the organization changed its name to Justice and Freedom Congress of Islamic Iran in 1999.

“Modern political schools of thought divide political parties based on their executive ideologies on how to run a society – based on people’s votes and the concept of majority rule. They view it as an achievement of modern civilization. However, the reality is that such ideas were formed during the advent of Islam. The Prophet [Muhammad], by relying on the Quran…used the word faction [party] first,” Rafsanjani said.

The Chairman of the Expediency Council stated that Iran’s Constitution has emphasized the importance of party plurality.

“Approved by Ayatollah Khomeini and the people, the constitution clearly emphasizes party diversity, which paved the way for the formation of small and big factions with different opinions. There are no real political parties in Iran, however the belief in party formation is prevalent,” Rafsanjani concluded.

Cleaning House in Tehran

I wrote an opinion piece on President Hassan Rouhani’s struggles with Iran’s precarious economy and its rampant corruption for The Majalla. The piece argues that despite real efforts to tackle its problems, Iran’s economy continues to be the biggest challenge for the new administration.

Despite real efforts to tackle its problems, Iran’s flagging economy continues to be the biggest challenge for President Hassan Rouhani’s government. During his 2013 presidential campaign he promised to resolve the country’s numerous financial issues, but seems to have underestimated the enormity of the task. Today, widespread and systemic corruption continues to plague the country’s financial sector, and a volatile currency exchange market threatens mid- to long-term investments.

Rouhani’s government of “prudence and hope” is fast approaching its one-year anniversary, but many of the economic campaign promises remain unfulfilled. During the June 2013 campaign, Rouhani pledged to focus on fundamental and institutional issues—a message applauded by the electorate. His aim was to reintroduce rational economic policy by welcoming back experts sidelined during the tenure of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president’s conservative–populist predecessor. Other ambitious promises included the reduction and, eventually, removal of international sanctions, more effective distribution of cash handouts, better liquidity controls, a reduction of inflation, curbing the currency’s volatility, and fighting corruption. Read more…

1414: Shahin Najafi's Melancholy Powerful New Album

Shahin Najafi is a popular Iranian rapper and song writer known for his provoking lyrics that question the social and political norms of the country. As one of the vanguards of the Iranian hip hop scene, Najafi’s songs deal with issues such as poverty, sexism, censorship, child labor, execution, and drug addiction. His songs often consist of strong poetic, literary, and philosophical elements that highlight the various dichotomies between the traditional aspects of the Iranian society and the modern values practiced by the new generation.

The 33-year-old artist’s new album, 1414, consists of four powerful songs that evoke unsettling emotions such as fear, confusion, loss, and longing. The new album is a telling melancholic self-portrait of the artist, but it also expresses the emotional state of many youth in post-revultionary Iran.

Confidential, a track from the album, deals with the state of paranoia experienced in the society due to government censorship and other imposed restrictions. Let’s listen!

What if there is a window behind my cross?
What if there is a mic in my pocket?

What if this SMS gets registered somewhere?
What if my cries over the phone get recorded?

What if they witness our quarrel in the car?
What if they watch you in the shower?

What if he enunciates your name with his mouth?
What if the television broadcasts my secret?

What if he knows something that I know!?
What if the day after tomorrow, I become Keyhan’s top headline?

What if doubt slips into my faithful heart?
What if I give up your name under beatings?

What if they publish my forged letter?
What if all the badness weakens my heart?

I’m bitter and the nightmare of my existence is dissolved in poison
Except you, I’m scared of all people

Everyone, intentionally or unintentionally, is a spy!
Their hands are the noose and they kiss you

I wish at the end of this chilling time, there would be a spring
I wish there was a escape route in your embrace

I wish I could conceal [my] joy from everyone
I wish your love could be tied to freedom

I wish this bad story does not end badly
I wish we sleep again, but for eternity

What if doubt slips into my faithful heart?
What if I give up your name under beatings?

What if they publish my forged letter?
What if all the badness weakens my heart?

Iran's Former Reformist President Cautiously Criticizes Rouhani

Iran’s former reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, delivered his annual Nowruz message via YouTube on Thursday, during which he cautiously criticized the achievements of President Rouhani’s administration thus far.

In his message Khatami highlights that the new government’s promises regarding political and social freedoms have not been fulfilled and that a large gap still exists between the ideals expected by voters and the delivered campaign promises by Iran’s moderate president, Hassan Rouhani.

The video appears to have been produced by the Baran Foundation, an NGO founded by Khatami after his presidential tenure (1997-2005) that mainly focuses on the promotion of social justice and the improvement of welfare programs.

The former president invited the Iranian citizens, especially the youth, to remain hopeful and continue to demand their rights, all while keeping their expectations realistic.

Khatami concluded his remarks with a poem from the beloved fourteenth century Persian poet, Hafez that seems to highlight his message of hope and perseverance.

The Persian text of the speech was published on Baran Foundation’s official website. The translation of the message is provided below.

In the name of God, the most compassionate, the most merciful.

In the name of God who is beautiful and likes beauty.
In the name of God, the most gracious, the most kind.
In the name of the God of spring, the God of human beings, the God of life.
The God who perfects his creation.
The God who wants humans to be alive, dynamic, and sophisticated.
The God who wants a beautiful life for all humans.

The past year, like many years before, consisted of a number of bitter and sweet events. Our nation has consistently tried to get past and tolerate hardships with grace, patience, and a sense for recognizing opportunities. In this manner, we have tried to improve our lives. This past year we witnessed an election that increased the hope in people; an election that should rightly be labeled as political heroism. The creation of a free and safe environment for all groups and factions was what the society expected and demanded. The [election] increased the hope of achieving such dreams. This amazing political achievement [2013 Presidential Election] could have become more glorious if the political environment would have opened up, if the environment of the country had transitioned from a security state to a political one, if political prisoners would have been freed, and if various restrictions and limitations on many individuals had lifted.

Unfortunately, however, such expectations did not come to fruition. Some attempts have been made, but they are not close to ideals. There is still hope for us to create an environment in which hearts are closer to each other. Such an environment would be beneficial for the people, the country, and the regime. It can increase passion and enthusiasm for the country’s development and cooperation in enhancing the state affairs.

We have many issues in many areas. Without a doubt, life is difficult for the majority of our people. Especially for the lower classes of our society, who are significant in numbers. Fortunately, in this regard, the plans and policies of the new administration are good. I hope that various departments and organizations support them. As witnessed, relative openings have been experienced in the foreign policy and economic arenas. However, these openings have to increase. While keeping in mind the national interests of the country, determined and solid steps forward should be taken. The beautiful side of Iran and the divine face of Islam should be demonstrated to the world. Commitment to ensuring the rights and welfare of a nation is a heavy responsibility for the administration and the regime. Of course, by keeping in mind the limitations and the available resources, [people] should keep their expectations at a realistic and logical level. However, we should never lose hope for the future.

Now, I would like to address the dear youth who are the country’s main asset. If there is freedom and prosperity, it is the youth who first experience it, and if there is restriction, unfortunately, it is also the youth who first experience it. But, the youth should never lose hope. They should continue to try. The regime should prepare the environment for the free, active, and enthusiastic presence of the youth in various sectors. All entrepreneurs, laborers, and all who are active should work together to advance the affairs of the country. The esteemed administration should prepare the background for the free presence of all factions, groups, organizations, and the private sector. The administration should utilize all internal and external talents in order to improve the situation. Fortunately, this intention exists and I hope to witness the realization of even bigger steps.

We have hope for the future. We are attached to this land and country. We count on our revolution. We want our regime to be prosperous and proud. In the foundation of this regime, we protect the honor, respect, and dignity of all humans. We hope to witness comprehensive reforms within the regime in the upcoming year–in order to strengthen the regime and to strengthen the foundations of national security and social prosperity. We also hope to witness the building of an environment that allows the use of internal and external recourses for improving the political, economical, and cultural situation of the country.

[…]

I wish for prosperity and happiness for all our dear people and for all who like Iran and Iranians. I hope to God, who has the power to change hearts, who controls the affairs, the God who creates days and nights, and the God who has the power to change all conditions and situations, to change our condition for the better. I hope it happens in a way that we are all happy with our daily lives. I hope that the people and the government step side by side towards a better future.

[Hafez – Ghazal #164]

Morning breeze, its fragrance will exhale
The old world will once again youthfully sail.
Tulip will bring a red cup to the meadows
Narcissus’ eyes from poppy will grow pale.
When would nightingale put up with such abuse
Leave not joy of the now till the morrow
Who can vouch that the morrow, the now shall trail?
Hold dear all the flowers and commune
Came to be and will whither with a breeze or a gale.
This feast is for friends, O minstrel, play and sing
Sing again, it came thus and went thus, to what avail?
Hafez, for your sake, entered this tale
Walk with him, say farewell, he’ll tear the veil

The Unveiling of Iran's Resistance Economy

On February 19, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, called on the three branches of the government to implement the general policies of a decree, dubbed as the resistance economy. The plan encourages indigenous development of new technologies and calls for an increase in oil and gas strategic reserves.

The plan also encourages greater privatization and increased exports of goods and services through administrative reform as well as foreign investment for export purposes.

Some analysts believe that the timing of the decree suggests that the Leader is not optimistic towards the outcome of the ongoing talks, so he is attempting to reduce the country’s vulnerability to external sanctions that may last for the foreseeable future.

Another probability is that Khamenei is hedging his bets. If Rouhani fails to deliver on his promise of easing sanctions through diplomacy or fails to implement his ambitious domestic economic plan, then the Supreme Leader could scuttle the nuclear talks and rely on the resistance economy.

Regardless of the alternate motives behind the decree, the main focus of the plan seems to be on building the country’s domestic capacity, which has been one of the long-term goals of the Islamic Republic.

The full text of the Supreme Leader’s letter and the decree, which you may find below, is well worth a read.

In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

If an Islamic Iran that has abundant spiritual and material resources, a rich and diverse set of talents, a widespread infrastructure, and, most importantly, a committed and proficient manpower that has the determination to advance, subscribes to an indigenous and scientific economic model that projects an Islamic and revolutionary culture, also known as a resistance economy, then not only will every economic problem be overcome, and the enemy, who has waged all-out economic warfare against our great nation, be defeated, but, in a world where risk and dishonesty produces uncontrollable instability in economic, financial, and political matters, we will be able to safeguard our country’s achievements in various fields, continue our progress, fulfill the goals and principles of the constitution and our 30-year visionary plan, and sustain an economy that is reliant on science and technology, is grounded in equality, is endogenous and outward looking, is dynamic and enhancing, and that will be based on an inspiring and objective Islamic economic system.

At the present, we have made the necessary considerations and consultations with the regime’s expediency council so that the policies of a resistance economy, that builds on and continues past policies outlined in Article 44 of the constitution, can strategically move towards fulfilling the excellent objectives that have been mentioned.

It is necessary that the country’s forces proceed in a timely manner to prepare the required laws and plans that will allow the people, and those active in the economy, to take part in this holy jihad so that the divine season for the great nation of Iran’s economic epic, like it’s political epic, can take place for the world to see. We ask the almighty god to give everyone success in this important matter.

Sayyid Ali Khamenei
19 February 2014

Policies of Resistance Economy

To provide dynamic growth, improve the indicators of a resistance economy, and to achieve the goals of the visionary 30-year plan, the policies of a resistance economy with a jihadi, flexible, opportunistic, productive, endogenous, and forward and outward looking approach are as follows:

1. Provide the conditions and opportunities, financial resources, and human and scientific investments in the country to expand and develop entrepreneurship. Expand cooperation between different social actors in the economy by facilitating and promoting collective collaboration; and emphasizing a rise in income for mid- and lower-income populations.

2. Pioneer a knowledge-based economy by implementing a general scientific plan in an innovative systematic manner for the nation in order to promote the nation’s international standing and increase the level of production and manufacturing of goods and knowledge-based services to become the leading regional knowledge-based economy.

3. Prioritize efficiency by strengthening productivity factors, empowering the work force, nurturing competitiveness between provinces, and taking advantage of the capacity and potential of the country’s diverse geography.

4. Utilizing the potential of applying subsidies to increase production and employment, to drastically decrease energy consumption, and improving the indicators of social equality.

5. Improve Total Factor Productivity based on the empowerment of domestic human resources through improving skills education, creativity, and entrepreneurship.

6. Increasing domestic production levels of basic institutions and goods, particularly in imported items; prioritizing the production of goods and strategic services; diversifying the source of supply for basic goods that are imported, with the intention of decreasing reliance are particular countries.

7. Establishing food and medicine security; creating a strategic reserve with an emphasis on increasing the quality and quantity of raw goods and materials.

8. Managing consumption with an emphasis on applying general policies that reform the consumption model and promote the consumption of domestic goods, along with plans to improve the quality and competitiveness of domestically produced goods.

9. Comprehensive reform of the country’s financial system with the intention of responding to the country’s financial requirements; the creation of stability in the country’s finances; pioneering the creation of a real financial sector.

10. All-out targeted support for the production of domestic goods and services, at levels proportional to value-added services that have a positive net-revenue, by way of:

• Simplifying regulations and expanding incentives;
• Expanding foreign services and necessary transportation and infrastructure.
• Encouraging foreign direct investment for exports.
• Adjusting national production according to export demands; creating new markets; diversification of economic ties with other countries, in particular with regional ones.
• Utilization of barter trade systems to simplify exchanges in line with demands.
• Creating stability in the process and regulation of exports, with the intention of expanding Iran’s share of target markets.

11. Expanding free-trade zones and the country’s unique economic activities with the intention of acquiring advanced technologies, and simplifying and expanding production, exporting goods and services, securing export demand and financial resources from abroad.

12.  Increasing the power of resistance and decreasing the country’s vulnerability by:

• Expanding strategic links and cooperation and consultation with regional and international countries, with a focus on neighboring countries.
• Utilization of diplomacy to safeguard economic interests and objectives.
• Utilizing the capabilities of international and regional structures and organizations.

13.  Addressing income vulnerabilities resulting from exporting oil and gas by:

• Choosing strategic customers
• Diversifying methods of sale
• Partnering with the private sector for sales
• Increasing gas exports
• Increasing electricity exports
• Increasing petrochemical exports
• Increasing exports of petroleum products

14.  Increasing the country’s strategic oil and gas reserves with the intention of effecting the international oil and gas markets; emphasizing the safeguarding and expansion of oil and gas production capabilities, particularly in shared fields.

15. Increasing added value by completing the value chain in the oil and gas industries; expanding the production of goods that yield optimal returns (according to an energy intensity index); increasing the export of electricity, petrochemical, and petroleum products, with a focus on conserving resources.

16.  Economizing social expenditures with a focus on fundamentally evolving its foundations, rationalizing the size of government, and disbanding duplicate or unnecessary agencies and departments.

17.  Reforming the government’s system for structuring wages, and increasing tax revenues.

18.  Increasing annual contributions to the National Development Fund from oil and gas exports until it no longer relies on the oil budget.

19.  Encouraging a transparent and healthy economy; preventing an environment that allows for corrupt actions in monetary, commercial, and currency matters.

20.  Nurturing a jihadi culture that brings value, creates wealth, and increases efficiency; promotes entrepreneurship and investments; generates employment opportunities; and that promotes the resistance economy among prominent actors in this field.

21. Explaining the dimensions of a resistance economy and shaping its discussion, particularly in academia and the media; and transforming this into an inclusive and popular national discussion.

22.  The government is obligated to fulfill the general policies of a resistance economy in a synchronized manner that mobilizes the dynamic capabilities of the country; the measures below shall be customary:

• Identifying and utilizing scientific, technical, and economic capacities to achieve appropriate measures.
• Observing sanctions, and increasing the cost to the enemy.
• Managing domestic and international economic risks by responding intelligently, actively, and in a timely manner to them.

23. Transparently and effectively distributing in, setting prices for, and updating the methods for administering the market.

24. Increasing standard coverage and the promotion of domestic products.

Clergys' Role Increases in Iran's Public Schools

Today’s guest author is Saeed Aganji, an Iranian independent journalist, researcher, and former editor-in-chief of the Saba student publication. 

Based on a new agreement between the Ministry of Education and Tehran seminaries, some public schools will start to be managed under the supervision of the seminary. This nascent arrangement has caused a great level of controversy and debate among its opponents and supporters. Many religious organizations have expressed their satisfaction, however, the educators of the country have cried out in protest.

According to the agreement, “Public schools covered under this plan will be rebranded as ‘Seminary Affiliated Schools’ and the management of the school will be permanently transferred to a cleric present on school grounds. Each year more schools will be added following the seminary’s approval.”

A representative of the Council of Cooperation between the Ministry of Education and the seminaries elaborated by stating, “This plan is being implemented in accordance with the Islamic Republic’s regulations and religious edicts. Additionally, [the agreement] aims to enforce foundational change in the education system with the focus of disseminating ideas that result in spreading the ideology of theVelayat-e faqih [Guardianship of the Jurists]…”

The current discourse, which is led by the seminary, is essentially rooted in their desire to maintain their own social status and advance their religious worldview. The intellectual and ideological reasoning of the religious class in Iran, which is generally associated with social, financial, and political advantages, has been damaged due to the overall intellectual and political growth of the Iranian society. If this process continues, the status of the clerical class will continue to deteriorate. This is why they are attempting to delay the inevitable by implementing the aforementioned plan.

The story of clerical involvement in Iran’s education system begins long before the 1979 Revolution. Prior to the advent of the modern education system in Iran all levels of education followed the seminary model and were supervised by clerics. However, beginning in the early 1850s, the first examples of nonreligious, Western-style schools began to operate. This process gradually removed the clerical class from the education system and left them in charge of the seminaries. However, the attempt to take back what was once their domain has continued since this separation. As an example, clerics acted as consultants for the writing of textbooks even before the 1979 Revolution.

Collaboration between the seminaries and nonreligious schools was strengthened after the Revolution due to the strong religious aspects of the ruling regime. In 2006, during Mahmoud Farshidi’s tenure as the Education Minister, this cooperation finally bared practical fruits. During that period the Amin Plan was introduced, which encouraged greater collaboration between seminaries and universities. This plan began its implementation phase in 2009 and ignited great levels of debate in the society. No official data is available on the exact number of universities that are participating in this program.

Furthermore, the background and social foundations of the traditionalist movement in Iran has been based on the pre-modern and pre-capitalist social classes. A substantial portion of the traditionalist class is made up of the clergy. The ideology of the traditionalists is an amalgamation of the ideals of the old aristocratic landowners, the clergy, elites, small shopkeepers, and peasants. Their ideology consists of elements such as social stability, social justice, and emphasizing the hierarchical and patriarchal social and political order.

This traditional movement has two ideological tendencies that are, at times, contradictory. One leaning is the radical egalitarian orientation that expresses petty bourgeois aspirations and the lower traditional classes. The second leaning has a conservative and somewhat elitist orientation. (The former trend was dominant until 1990 and the latter orientation has taken over since.)

In any case, since such groups are always subject to change and prone to collapse, they tend to want to control their own destiny by promoting complete organizational independence. This is one of the main reasons for their discomfort with secular and nonreligious educational centers.

Additionally, the mindset of the traditionalist movement in Iran could be seen in the sense of insecurity, defenselessness, and disunity of this class within today’s society. The clergy class, as the prominent symbol of the traditionalist movement, has always been under a great amount of psychological pressure.

The traditional bonds between the clergy and its supporters have dwindled over time due to the process of modernization and the rebirth of social and political movements. When these traditional ties weaken, a sense of insecurity overcomes the clerics. This sense of future uncertainty, which may result in elimination of their higher social, political, and financial status, causes them to react. Their attempt to penetrate the education system of the country is a means for ideological survival.

Naturally, there is an intense debate happening among the opponents and proponents of this plan. The supporters often argue the following points in defense of their position:

• The students’ religious and theological foundations will be strengthened.
•  The education system will be used to its full capacity to promote the development of all aspects of the students’ lives, which includes spiritual growth.
• Healthy competition will be created between public schools.
• The government’s hegemony over the education system will be reduced.

A quote from an interview with Mohammad Hassan Nabavi, the Public Relations Deputy of the Qom Seminary, sheds some light on other potential reasons for the plan. “The average aptitude of the admitted students to the seminary is low. If we create schools that attract talented individuals, we will encourage students with high aptitude to join such education centers. If implemented correctly, this plan could get rid of the impractical practices of the current system of student submission. We have started our work in high schools and middle schools, but we believe that a comprehensive training process needs to begin from the first day of education. We have to enter the process as early as possible. We believe that such education centers should even start in preschool,” Nabavi stated.

The opposition, which mainly consists of teachers and educators, has been very outspoken. Their reasons can be summarized in the following four points:

• There was a strong emphasis on the independence of the two entities in the previous cooperative agreement between the seminary and the education system. However, the current arrangement undermines the independence of the Education Ministry and it has the potential to break the regulations of this department. Therefore, this agreement is actually illegal. Additionally, this accord ignores the opinion of parents and the preference of students.
• This agreement is indicative if the government’s lack of trust towards the country’s teachers and educators. The seminary’s interference in the education sector and its executive matters will, in a way, create a dual management structure, which will cause a great deal of confusion. The school principle will be receiving his direction from the Education Ministry, while the clergy at the same school receives his orders from the seminary. This dichotomy will only harm the students.
• Placing religious clergy in schools will draw from the Ministry of Education’s resources and will be a costly item in its budget. Particularly since the Ministry already faces financial troubles, there is no need to take on additional costs.
• The continued presence of a spiritual authority with special influence at schools will certainly disturb the organizational and educational procedures already in place. This arrangement will reduce the effectiveness of these education centers.

Such an arrangement has already proven to be ineffective at the university level and it will fail again. Due to their ability to access updated information from across the world, Iranian adolescents are moving away from religious teachings. Compared to previous generations, they have a much less fervent attitude towards religion. The clerics understand the effectiveness of religion as a tool to influence the public, but they are essentially fighting a losing battle with the ever-changing world of information technology and the youth’s insatiable appetite for contemporary knowledge.

Pallet Band Protests the Ban-of Showing Musicals Instruments on Iranian TV by Miming

Showing musical instruments has been banned on Iranian TV since the early days of the Revolution. Some hardline clerics believe broadcasting music promotes depravity and should be banned altogether. Due to this strict interpretation, for many years broadcasting pop music did not have a place on the state media. Overtime, because of more lenient Islamic interpretations and reformist polices, this taboo was broken. However, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) has adopted a curious policy of broadcasting music without actually showing the instruments. When airing a concert or a music video the images of musicians are often replaced with scenes from the nature such as flowers or waterfalls.

IRIB has faced a lot of criticism from artists, musicians, and cultural figures who are concerned about the young generations that are being cut off from their heritage.

In a recent attempt to highlight the absurdity of this rule, a popular jazz-fusion banned, Pallet Band, mimed instruments during a performance broadcasted on Radio 7, an entertainment program on Iran’s channel seven.

Many Iranians on social networks hailed this performance by the group as a clever, humorous, and effective way of protesting the status quo.

Lost in Translation

My latest piece is a personal story about a magical bookstore in my old neighborhood in Tehran first published on Medium. I would like to invite you to take a trip down memory lane with me.

It was a very pleasant surprise when I learned that my old neighborhood in Iran has started a Facebook page. I immediately rushed to the website and began clicking through the numerous pictures. Every click hit me with a barrage of bittersweet adolescence memories: elementary school, playing in the streets, friendships, juvenile fights, and first crushes. I could hear the shouts of frustrated mothers demanding their kids to return home for supper, taste the sweet and sour half ripened white berries my classmates and I would mercilessly pick from trees, and even smell the neighborhood’s air — polluted with a scent of car exhaust and burnt oil.

I grew up on Sohrevardi in northeast Tehran. Named after Shahab al-din Sohrevardi, a 12th century Iranian sufi philosopher, the neighborhood bares little resemblance to the mild manner of its mystic namesake. It is a hustling and bustling residential district, full of tall apartment buildings and peppered with plenty of businesses, restaurants, banks, cafes, and mom and pop stores.

Reliving my childhood one picture at a time, I came across an image that gave me a pause. It’s a grainy, slightly out of focused photo of an unassuming storefront with a tree blocking half the view. A simple sign reads, “Kamal-ol-Molk* Bookstore.” Read more…

Tough Challenges Lie Ahead of Iran Nuclear Deal

The nuclear deal reached between Iran and the P5+1–five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany–is a historic breakthrough and a great step forward, but many domestic and regional obstacles threaten the longevity of this interim agreement.

Hardline factions within Iran are concerned about the potential results of a long-lasting deal that could alter the anti-western nature of the regime, while other countries in the region, such as Israel, find the Islamic Republic’s ambitions to be dubious. Iran’s moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, has to navigate a number of impediments during the next six-month interim agreement in order to set the stage for a potential long-term deal.

The current agreement caps all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. No new centrifuges will be installed, no new enrichment facilities will open, and activities at the Arak heavy-water production plant will be limited and eventually stopped. Furthermore, daily IAEA inspections at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities will be allowed, uranium enriched above 5% will be diluted to below 5%, and stocks of 3.5% enriched uranium will not be increased. In return, Iran regains access to nearly $4.2 billion of its frozen assets and will see an easing of restrictions on trade in petrochemical products, precious metals, and parts for aircraft and automobiles. It is estimated that the total financial package will be worth $7 billion to the country’s economy over six months.

EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif along with the foreign ministers of six world powers in Geneva.

This agreement may not be ideal for the West or Iran, but isn’t that the definition of a good compromise? The Islamic Republic freezes its production of 20% enriched uranium and dilutes the current stockpile, easily arguable as a step back from what the country has long labeled as a “heroic national accomplishment.” The West, by agreeing to a 5% enrichment level, tacitly approves of Iran’s right to enrich, a concession that could be costly in the eyes of many hawks.

Nevertheless, the deal is “limited, temporary…and reversible,” which is true in regards to sanctions relief and Iran’s ability to restart its nuclear activities. Six months is a short testing period for each side to examine the other’s commitment– a genuine, and much needed, trust building exercise.

This trial period will not take place in a vacuum. There are many domestic and regional obstacles that could easily derail the process and hamper the development of a long-term deal.            

Domestic Challenges

The major domestic obstacle for president Rouhani’s moderate administration is the opposition of hardline factions. Iran’s radical conservatives fear that any attempt to make peace with their enemy could result in tectonic shifts in the ideological foundations of the regime, which recognizes the western world as enemies of the values preached by the Islamic Republic.

Hours after the details of the nuclear agreement were announced, Keyhan, a conservative Iranian newspaper, published an article discrediting the accomplishment. “The U.S. Was Not Trustworthy: The Geneva Agreement Lasted for One Hour,” read the title of the piece. The editorial criticized the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry by adding that Iran’s right to uranium enrichment was being “violated and denied.”

For the time being, however, criticism seems to be coming from semi-independent conservative factions driven by ideology and a culture of resistance. The country’s senior political elite, including the Supreme Leader, seem to be united in praising the agreement as a victory.

In a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei that summarized the accomplishments of his first 100 days, Rouhani announced that the West acknowledged Iran’s right to enrichment and, as a result, sanctions will be eased.

“Achieving what you have stated is worthy of praise and appreciation of the nuclear team and other practitioners. This could be the basis for other thoughtful initiatives,” Khamenei wrote in his reply.

The interim agreement, as interpreted by Iranian officials, allows the country to enrich up to 5%, provides some much needed economic breathing room by easing sanctions, and reduces the chance of a military strike by Israel. However, as indicated by some of his recent anti-western rhetoric, Ayatollah Khamenei reserves the right to rain on the diplomatic parade if he senses that the ideological and security foundations of the regime are in danger.

Rouhani has been able to keep Khamenei content, and extremist factions at bay, because of his biggest source of political capital–the popular support of millions of Iranians. Rouhani acknowledges the value of popular support–an asset his predecessor lacked–and will do all he can to maintain it.

“Everything we have is because of you. Because of your resistance, your unity, your solidarity, and your unwavering support. The epic [election turnout] on June 14 was your creation. And today, this success is one of the fruits of that epic political presence. The government is proud to have achieved this success within the first 100 days of its administration. God willing, this path will continue with your assistance,”Rouhani announced in his speech to the nation following the nuclear deal.

Regional Challenges

The Iran deal could lead into a more permanent rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran, which is a big cause for concern on the parts of Israel and other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia.

In the eyes of many regional countries, Iran remains a revolutionary country with hegemonic aspirations. Any type of a long-term agreement could perpetuate the Islamic Republic’s ambitions, which may threaten the region. In the eyes of the Saudis, if Iran is no longer spending its resources to combat the United States, then it will be better positioned to dominate the Persian Gulf–a historic rivalry for regional supremacy between the two countries recently intensified due to political instability in Bahrain.

It is also feared that the ongoing negotiations will give Tehran a free hand to expand its support for the Syrian government and other U.S. adversaries throughout the region, such as Hezbollah–a concern for Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries.

Furthermore, Israel still views Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat. Hours after the agreement was reached between Iran and P5+1, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that “What was concluded in Geneva…is not a historic agreement, it’s a historic mistake.”

As an opponent of the deal, Israel believes the agreement provides Iran with too much freedom to continue with its enrichment efforts, and that it is simply a tactic used by Tehran to buy time. They are suspicious of Iran’s diplomatic rhetoric and believe it to be nothing but a “smiley campaign” launched by Rouhani to fool the western powers.

For the time being, Rouhani seems to have the support of the White House. Obama is discouraging the U.S. Congress from imposing any additional sanctions by highlighting their potential damage to the deal. Israel is not staying quiet and the U.S. Administration is attempting to appease Netanyahu while Iran’s commitment to the deal is tested. Rouhani is battling his opponents at home, while trying to pacify the country’s apprehensive Arab neighbors. The ultimate success of the interim agreement depends on how the U.S. and Iran manage to handle the worthy adversaries of a potential long-term deal.

Rouhani Loves Hiking!

One of the favorite pastimes of Iran’s moderate president is hiking. According to his official website, Rouhani goes hiking once or twice a week at the mountain ranges surrounding Tehran.

“What makes hiking even more enjoyable for the president are the girls, boys, men, and women who start a dialogue with him and share their hopes and dreams,” Rouhani’s website reports.

Here are a few pictures of Rouhani’s hiking adventures.

Ahmadinejad Fails to Appear in Court

Iran’s former president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, failed to appear in court on November 26 to face nine charges levied against him from his time in office.

“The court hearing to discuss the allegations against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was held in Tehran’s 76th penal court branch in his absence. In this session the judicial committee heard the testimony of the plaintiffs,” said Mohsen Eftekhari, Head of Tehran’s Penal Courts.

According to Alef, a conservative website affiliated with a prominent Iranian parliamentarian, the Article 90 Commission is the legal plaintiff and other accusers are individuals.

Article 90 of Iran’s Constitution puts the Parliament in charge of investigating complaints made about the operation of the Parliament, the Executive, and the Judiciary. A parliamentary commission oversees this process.

The cases against the former president include a delay in the operation of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, a failure to carry out the structure of the National Iranian Oil Company, and a failure to allocate the budget for Iran’s metro transport system.

Within the past few days, Ahmadinejad’s supports have been calling for protests in front of the court, but Iranian media has not reported any news of such gatherings.

Ahmadinejad’s bombastic style of governing and his brazen willingness to challenge any opponent created many rifts within the various domestic political factions. The crisis reached its climax when the Supreme Leader considered eliminating the Iranian presidency all together.

The election of Rouhani, a regime moderate backed by reformists, is a welcomed change by the country’s senior officials. 

Zarif Condemns Extremism on His Facebook Page

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, who enjoys more than 620,000 Facebook fans, posted a status on November 20 about his reaction to the recent terrorist attack on his country’s embassy in Beirut. Zarif condemned the attacks by calling for a “fundamental and coordinated” global effort to end extremism.

Reportedly the al-Qaeda-linked Abdullah Azzam Brigades took responsibility for Tuesday’s suicide bombing on the Iranian embassy in Lebanon. The attack killed 25, including an Iranian diplomat, and injured 150 individuals.

Zarif first heard about the incident at an airport in Rome on his way to meet with Italy’s Foreign Minister Emma Bonino. I translated parts of Zarif’s Facebook status below.

“After a two week delay, I succeeded in traveling to Rome for a 3-hour trip. In the Rome airport, I was notified that extremists have conducted a terrorist attack against our embassy in Beirut and have martyred our Cultural Attache and a number of other innocent people. It was necessary for me to have a phone conversation with our country’s ambassador in Beirut. I extend my condolences to him and the family of the martyrs, arranged the necessities for attending to the victims and their families, followed up on the issue, and spoke about preventing the recurrence of similar disasters. I also asked the Arab and African Deputy of the Foreign Ministry who was in Moscow for consultations to immediately go to Beirut and follow up in person. Since yesterday, the majority of countries’ officials have condemned this terrorist act and extended their sympathy to the Iranian people, government, and the families of martyrs. Truly, extremism is a serious threat to all in the region and the entire world. It is necessary to combat it in a fundamental and coordinated fashion globally.”

A Crucial Election for Iran's Reform Movement

You may find my latest article for Jadaliyya below. 

Today, Iranians cast their vote for the country’s eleventh presidential election. It certainly will not be an easy decision, with a field of candidates that lack any sense of major diversity in their policies and ideologies. With one glaring exception, the deck is stacked in favor of the conservative elites.

As any astute student of Iran knows, predicting the outcome of the election is virtually impossible. The only conclusion thus far is that the road has not been kind to the reformists this election cycle. They lost their desired choice of Hashemi Rafsanjani through the qualification process. They were also forced to convince Mohammed Reza Aref, the sole reformist candidate, to withdraw in favor of Hassan Rouhani. Disillusioned by the whole process, some reformists remain jaded about participating in the election.

How Did We Get Here?

The disqualification of Hashemi Rafsanjani stacked the deck in favor of the Supreme Leader and the conservative elites by paving the way for the election of a candidate utterly loyal to the regime. Disqualifying Rafsanjani indicates, once again, that the regime’s inner circle is shrinking and that power is becoming more centralized. But why was the reformist faction counting on Rafsanjani, and why are they currently backing Hassan Rouhani? As long time regime insiders, they can hardly be labeled as reformists. The answer is simple. There is no alternative.

Following the 2009 disputed presidential election in Iran, all major reformist factions were ousted from the political scene and hundreds of reform-minded politicians, activists, and journalists were purged from public life. The 2009 reformist candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, are still under house arrest at unknown locations. Significantly weakened, reformists were left to wonder about their future in a seemingly exclusive regime. Realizing that no major reformist candidate would have a chance of getting through the Guardian Council (the twelve-member conservative body in charge of qualifying all election candidates and thus vetting them), they viewed Rafsanjani’s decision to run as a blessing.

As one of the founding members of the Islamic Republic, and the current chairman of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani presented the best chance for the opposition factions in Iran. His long resume includes influential positions such as the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Speaker of the Parliament, Interior Minister, and the de facto commander-in-chief of the military during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). He is also credited for buttressing Ayatollah Khamenei’s ascendency to Supreme Leadership. The possibility of his disqualification by the ruling conservatives seemed unlikely due to his history and accomplishments.

Divisions within the Reformist Faction

Major divisions permeate the reformist factions regarding whether they should consider not participating in elections in the Islamic Republic. Yet, reformists led by former president Mohammad Khatami announced on 10 June that they will endorse Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric who is also backed by Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rouhani is a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Supreme National Security Council. He has inched closer to the reformists, but more than likely he is vying for popular support and lacks any genuine plans for transforming the system. As a long time member of the country’s Supreme National Security Council and the former chief nuclear negotiator, Rouhani has proven loyal to the ruling establishment and has managed to retain his positions even after the 2009 shake-up. More than likely, anyone expecting him to cross the regime’s redlines will be disappointed.

Once again, reformists find themselves with no alternatives. Presidential candidate Mohammad Reza Aref, former President Khatami’s Minister of Technology, was the sole reformist candidate who dropped out in favor of Rouhani on 10 June. Aref did not have the clout to be a real threat in a race packed with conservative heavyweights. A comment made by Aref best explains the position of reformists who favor participation: “Boycotting the election is not a form of protest, it is retreating.”

Reviving a Movement

By voting for Rouhani, reformists hope to create enough breathing room for the country’s diaspora to reignite the same grassroots activism experienced during Khatami’s presidency. The Supreme Leader may set clear limits, but Rouhani’s moderate tone and pragmatism are appealing when measured against some other candidates. Such an opening may allow the reformist faction to revive the activities of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, a dominant reformist political group, credited for implementing the reformist agenda during Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005). In June 2009, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Saeed Hajarian, and other prominent leaders of the party were arrested and the group was essentially dismantled. Mirdamadi is currently serving the remainder of his six-year sentence in Evin prison.

The release of Mousavi, Karroubi, and other political prisoners such as Mostafa Tajzadeh is another top priority for reformists in favor of participating in the upcoming election. Tajzadeh, a former Political Deputy Minister of Interior, was one of the seven leading reformists who sued several IRGC commanders for their alleged intervention in the 2009 presidential election. By electing a moderate figure such as Rouhani, they hope to reach that goal.

To Participate or Not?

Reformists in Iran are far from united. In a recent statement published on 4 June, the Mujahideen of the Islamic Revolution, a reformist political faction formed in 1991, asked the country’s reformists to boycott the upcoming election and refrain from supporting a candidate. The statement released by the group said, “The upcoming presidential elections should not be viewed as legitimate” and the results will “more than likely be engineered.” The majority of the reformists who signed the statement live abroad.

Ayatollah Mohmmad Mousavi Khoeiniha, an Iranian cleric and the secretary general of the reformist Association of Combatant Clerics, has also voiced his disapproval of the upcoming election. Khoeiniha stated:

I do not believe in election participation under any circumstances. Participation will only harm the reform movement….Election participation should be dignified. Election participation should be within the framework of improving the goals of the reform movement. We should not allow the current ruling faction…to lead us to a dead end.

The reformist group opposing election participation is less clear about its ultimate goals. Given the country’s current intolerant state, they view participation to be superfluous and serving the interests of the ruling conservatives.

What Is Next?

Iranian reformists are not naïve. Even Khatami indicated his doubt about the undemocratic nature of the election in prior months. “Even if we [reformists] are qualified, we will not have the right to get any more votes than what they [ruling conservatives] have already decided,” Khatami stated in a speech to university students in Tehran on 9 May.

The problem for the reformist opposition is not their lack of understanding of the domestic political dynamics or being blindly optimistic about the future. The issue is their inability to reach a consensus about the regime’s ability to reform. The regime has repeatedly cracked down on any meaningful reforms. Amid the height of the reformist era in the 1990s, popular student protests were crushed, prominent reformists were jailed and threatened, hundreds of reformist parliamentary members were banned from reelection in 2004, and hundreds of other reform-minded activists were jailed and threatened in 2009.

The current goal is to get Rouhani elected in order to create space for the reformists. But what if he is not the winner? This is an uncomfortable impasse for reformists. If reforms are no longer possible, then what is the alternative? The Iranian opposition—and perhaps the greater public—is not ready to answer that question yet.

Ahmadinejad's Last Stand

My guest post on The Foreigner:

Iran’s complex bureaucracy is slowly getting ready for another presidential election in June, but thus far the dynamic between the president’s faction and the regime has proven to be far from the ordinary.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s tenure in office will be officially over this summer, however, he may not be ready to go down without a fight. Despite all warnings from regime officials, the president seems adamant about engineering a campaign victory for his right-hand man, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei.

Rahim Mashaei has not officially announced his candidacy, but the campaign seems to be well on its way. Numerous analyses suggest that Ahmadinejad’s faction will not have a chance in the election. More than likely any candidate perceived to be associated with the “deviant faction” – a term used to refer to the president’s supporters and his controversial ally Rahim Mashaei – will be disqualified by the Guardian Council and eliminated from the political arena. So, why is Ahmadinejad still campaigning? And how does the government perceive the intentions of the “deviant faction?”

Shortly after the 2009 presidential election, regime stalwarts began referring to Ahmadinejad and his camp as the deviant faction. The rift began when the president publicly challenged the Supreme Leader over his constitutional right to choose the government’s ministers. The critics believe Ahmadinejad’s brand of politics has deviated from the path of the velayat-e faqih or rule by jurisprudence.

WHAT IS HE THINKING?

Ahmadinejad knows the history of the Islamic Republic well. As evidenced by the fate of his predecessors, Ahmadinejad understands that the regime is not kind to losers. The defeated tend to be marginalized, access to the state controlled media is lost, and at times they are even physically harmed.

Mohammad Khatami and his reformist allies were denied any major national prominence after his presidency ended in 2005. Another president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, was ousted from influential positions, after he called for unity following the 2009 presidential election. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, former regime members and presidential candidates, are still under house arrest at an unknown location.

Given his reputation among the influential regime members, Ahmadinejad recognizes that a dark horizon also awaits him and his camp. So, why stop fighting now?

In Ahmadinejad’s mind, the true test of his legacy will come in the next two months. Ahmadinejad has proven over and over again that he is not willing to go down without a fight and the home stretch is no time to quit. The best-case scenario will be for him to grant a safe passage for Mashaei through the Guardian Council’s vetting process, or at least assure that his faction will survive after he is no longer in office. He may even succeed in rallying the public opinion behind his camp, which may offer some kind of protection after he leaves the office.

The exact next steps of the president’s camp are not clear, but the regime should beware of a man with nothing to lose. The president has demonstrated that he is even willing to play dirty. As displayed on the floor of the parliament during an altercation with the speaker, Ali Larijani, Ahmadinejad is not afraid to publicly disclose sensitive information. In early February, Ahmadinejad challenged Larijani by accusing him of patronage, corruption, and “mafia-like rule.” He went so far as to play a tape of what he claimed was a recording of a conversation between Tehran’s Chief Prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, and Fazel Larijani, the speaker’s brother.

According to the tape, the Larijani family had used its prominence for economic gain. Larijani refuted the relevance of the tape and labeled it as blackmail. This unparalleled public confrontation forced the Supreme Leader issue harsh warnings. Ahmadinejad may have similar evidence and, more than likely, he will use such unorthodox tactics to ensure his longevity until the June presidential elections.

In the meantime, Ahmadinejad is doing all he can to paint himself as a populist president by paying lip service to the public. During his trip to the Khuzestan Province in southwestern Iran on April 22, Ahmadinejad announced, “They have sent a message saying that if I become any bolder, they will try to hurt me. I will fight in the service of justice, revolution, and people…until death. Thousands of Ahmadinejads are not worth as much as a drop of justice or a piece of hair from the head of an Iranian citizen.”

During his trip to Semnan Province on April 11, the president went so far as to throw a jab at the Supreme Leader and the ruling establishment. “Some say that the Leader’s opinion dictates that this person should run and that person should not [campaign]. How is this any of your business? The people should decide. All [political] types should run,” Ahmadinejad announced.

The president’s camp also hosted an event on April 18 at Tehran’s Azadi Stadium. The government had previously announced that the event’s purpose was to “acknowledge the servants of Norouz [the Iranian New Year].” However, critics of Ahmadinejad called it an illegal “election gathering,” because many expected Ahmadinejad to bring his chosen successor, Rahim Mashaei.

The controversial rally was held despite the president’s opponents accusing him of spending public funds for an extravagant gathering with political intentions. According to Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of Keyhan, a conservative newspaper close to the Supreme Leader, $40 million was spent on organizing the event. In an editorial written on April 23, Shariatmadari questioned the genuineness the president’s calls for justice and equality. “$40 million was taken away from the oppressed and disposed people in order to organize an election advertising event for Mr. Mashaei in the Azadi stadium. Is this an example of Mr. president’s justice seeking?”

According to IRNA news agency, nearly 70,000 supporters were in attendance, but the Iranian state media showed footage of almost deserted bleachers. Supporters of the president claimed that the video angles were chosen purposefully to only capture the empty areas, and make the event look like a failure.

THE ESTABLISHMENT’S POINT OF VIEW

Ahmadinejad rarely provides any details about the threats he receives, but it is safe to say that he is being pressured by regime officials to end his uncouth behavior. More than likely traditional conservatives do not view Ahmadinejad as a legitimate political threat to their chances of an election victory. The Guardian Council, the major constitutional body in charge of vetting the candidates, is under their control, so any candidate supported by the president could easily be disqualified. But they still view the president as someone who could further damage their personal reputations and the regime’s legitimacy.

More than once Ahmadinejad has announced that he is willing to publicize confidential records exposing his opponent’s past indiscretions. According to the BBC Persian service, during his visit to the Khuzestan Province, the president once again made his intentions public.

“Some send messages saying that they will confront me because of some of my statements. You are nothing in front of the will of the Iranian nation. This nation has stood up in front of the biggest oppressors; compared to them you [traditional conservatives] are nothing. If only the smallest part of your past behaviors are exposed, you will lose your place among the people,” Ahmadinejad declared. Many influential members of the political establishment have warned Iran’s outgoing president about his bombastic behavior, but to no avail.

On April 12, Ayatollah Momen, an influential member of the Guardian Council, warned Ahmadinejad and his camp by stating, “Don’t have any doubt. If we just sense a little deviation from a [candidate], we will disqualify him.” According to the Young Journalists Club, an Iranian semi-official news agency, Sadeq Larijani, the head of the country’s judicial system, criticized Ahmadinejad’s election efforts, saying “Unfortunately, some activities that are carried out with the government’s budget feel like election campaigns.” He continued by adding that such actions are considered to be a “crime” and the Guardian Council and the Judiciary are closely watching the perpetrators.

On April 23, Major General Hassan Firuzabadi, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, rejected the validity of any threats aimed at Ahmadinejad and advised him to be more measured in his claims. According to Mehr News, a semi-official news agency, Firuzabadi labeled Ahmadinejad’s statements as “unacceptable” and aimed at “disturbing the public opinion.” He added, “Mr. Ahmadinejad should stop making such statements.”

The warnings go on, but the regime is not counting on Ahmadinejad to listen. Security preparations are underway to insure a safe and calm election season. Of course, such moves include but are not limited to just concerns about Ahmadinejad’s deviant faction. Having experienced months of instability following the disputed 2009 presidential election, the regime is not taking any unnecessary risks.

It is difficult to assess Ahmadinejad’s ability or willingness to create the kind unrest seen in 2009. But, in the regime’s point of view, any potential for instability is considered a risk; so it’s always better to be safe than sorry.

In an interview with Mehr News on April 22, Firuzabadi also stated that the Iranian armed forces are “completely ready to confront any potential sedition” in the upcoming June elections. “Our armed forces are highly trained and experienced. They have the experience of the 2009 sedition, so they are familiar with the manner and the details of how to confront any potential dangers.”

On April 19, Iranian Police Chief Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam announced the reimplementation of new “moral and security” measures ahead of the upcoming elections. The move follows an April 16 announcement by Deputy Police Chief Brigadier General Saeed Montazeralmehdi on that an elections headquarters would be created for police to provide security for the elections and monitor anti-regime websites and social media.

The Cultural Ministry also recently announced that all mass text messages sent from election campaigns should be preapproved. According to TELNA, an Iranian information technology website, the spokesperson for ministry stated, “All SMS messages must be sent from traceable and known numbers…the content of such messages will also be controlled.”

In the coming months the battle between the president’s camp and the establishment will intensify. It is impossible to predict Ahmadinejad’s next move, but one thing that is guaranteed is his willingness to fight until the last breath. He does not have that many alternatives. He has to remain aggressive all the way up to the election, since otherwise he risks impending obsoleteness.

Iranian Conservatives Divided Ahead of Parliamentary Elections

My guest post for The Foreigner:

Today’s headlines are dominated by Iran after a plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. was revealed yesterday. Open conflict among the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Iran may not be imminent, but conflict within Iran is ongoing, as conservative factions struggle to form a unified camp and President Ahmadinejad’s party is marginalized even further.

Iran’s maverick president has caused so much acrimony since his disputed re-election in 2009 that the conservatives are more fractured than ever. This fragmentation not only presents obstacles to running the country, but also poses problems for the conservatives as parliamentary elections approach in March 2012.

As the conservatives gear up for the upcoming polls, coalitions and alliances are proving to be more difficult to form than ever. One reason for this was the recent fierce battle between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, which alienated some of the newcomers to the conservative camp. For example, Ahmadinejad’s Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaiee and his supporters were labeled as the “deviant movement” for their unorthodox, and by some standards heretical, views of Shiite theology. Conservative camps had to choose a side. They were either with the Supreme Leader, or with their nonconformist president.

Partisan infighting is not a new phenomenon. The 32-year history of the Islamic Republic consists of complicated and nuanced internal strife between the country’s numerous political factions. Evidently, the reformist years of President Khatami, 1997-2005, and the events following the disputed 2009 presidential election highlighted the distinctions between the reformist and conservative factions of the regime. However, misguidedly, the country’s ruling conservative faction is often painted as a monolithic and unified force. In fact, there are numerous shades of conservatism in Iran, which frequently cause disputes among the ruling clerics.

Case in point was the reaction of the conservatives to the results of the contested 2009 presidential elections. More traditional conservatives, such as Mohsen Rezaei, influential politician and former Revolutionary Guard Commander, went as far as to question the election result, while more radical individuals, such as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, hardliner cleric and a member of the Assembly of Experts, decidedly announced their support for the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Conservative rifts will not have an immediate impact on Iran’s nuclear policy or the country’s general attitude toward the United States. The diversity among the conservatives is related to their ideological and domestic policy differences. As for Iran’s nuclear program, the extreme majority of the conservatives agree with the country’s right to pursue its nuclear ambitions. This is a domestic battle and the winner will attempt to impose his own version of conservatism while in power.

In preparation for the upcoming elections, Iran’s conservative forces have started an inner- party dialogue, which is often backed by public statements indicative of their progress. The conservative forces consist of traditional factions, neo-conservatives, and right-leaning groups.

The Traditional Groups

• Combatant Clergy Association, Jame’e-ye Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez, founded in 1978, plays an important role in deciding the conservative political agenda in the country. The positions by the group tend to be aligned with the government and based on the traditional conservative line of thinking. Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Chairman of the Assembly of Experts and the head of Combatant Clergy Association, has expressed concern about the divisions in the conservative camp, and he is attempting to act as an appeasing force among the different factions.
• Society of the Lecturers of Qom Seminary, Jame’eh-ye Modarresin-e Howzeh-ye Elmiyyeh Qom, founded in 1961, is a conservative group that nominates the lecturers of the Qom seminary who are aligned with the regime. The society is headed by Mohammad Yazdi, Iran’s former Head of Judiciary. More than likely, this group will play the role of an appeaser in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
• The Islamic Coalition Party, Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami, founded in 1962, is traditionally close to Iran’s bazaari merchants. They helped in funding the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran during the 1979 Revolution. They are one of the most powerful and influential conservative coalitions and have strong connections with the non-governmental financial institutions. They tend to lean toward moderate conservatism.
• The Followers of Imam’s Line and the Supreme Leader, Jebhe-ye Peyrovan Khat-e Emam va Rahbari, is a coalition of 14 conservative political groups. Habibollah Asgaroladi is the chairman of this coalition and they tend to function under the umbrella of the the Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami.

Iranian New Conservatives

The participation of three influential figures who comprise the new conservative camp is important to note; Ali Larijani, Chairman of the Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Mayor of Tehran, and Mohsen Rezaie, former IRGC commander and a member of the Expediency Council.

It is difficult to gauge the involvement of these individuals in the upcoming parliamentary elections, but more than likely they will act as influential figures who will set forth the agenda of the conservative party as a whole. The trio does not represent new figures in the Iranian political scene, but their emphasis on liberal economic policies, moderate political ideology, and criticism toward the radical factions has earned them the title of the “new conservatives” in Iran.

Ali Larijani is not part of an official conservative group, but he and his brothers hold key political positions in the system. He is the parliamentary member from Qom, which has made his relationship with the ruling clergy more significant and more influential.As the mayor of the capital, Ghalibaf has proven to be a capable technocrat, managing one of the largest urban areas in the world. He tends to stay away from any political infighting and often uses his newspaper—the Tehran Emrooz—to broadcast his opinions.

Mohsen Rezaie founded the Resistance Front, Jebheye Istadegi, after the 2009 presidential elections in order to analyze the issues facing the conservatives. He is a regular commentator on various media outlets.

The Radical Right

• Esfandiar Rahim Mashaiee, president Ahmadinejad’s closest confidant and his in-law, is the main organizer of support for the president and his faction in the parliament. After the political battle between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, this group has an uncertain future. It is not clear if they will have enough political influence to carry on.
• Society of the Devotees of the Islamic Republic, Jam`iyat-e Isargaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, informally referred to as Isargaran,is a radical right-wing group, which was originally founded by Ahmadinejad. After the president’s scuffle with the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad’s name has been removed from the society’s executive board.The group has focused on highlighting the economic class differences existing in Iranian society. They pander to the impoverished individuals in the public and have been claiming to pursue “justice, simple living, and combating economic corruption.” The executive board consists of 16 individuals, headed by Hossein Fadaie.
• Unwavering Front, Jebheye Paydar, headed by the conservative cleric, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. This coalition has entered the arena to serve as the alliance against candidates supporting Mashaiee. This group does not believe in the political philosophy of the more moderate factions, such as the Combatant Clergy Association and Society of the Lectures of Qom Seminary, and individuals such as Mahdavi Kani.This group has distanced itself from the “deviant movement,” but it still supports Ahmadinejad. It is attempting to make a distinction from the Mashaiee camp and the president.

At a cursory glance the Iranian conservative block might appear to be a unified and cohesive body, but in reality it consists of a number of diverse factions and individuals with different beliefs. Although the internal political struggle does not have an immediate impact on Iran’s posture toward the United States, it has major implications for the future stability and nature of the regime. Understanding the differences between the various conservative groups in Iran can help us form a more complete picture of the ambiguous decision-making process in Iran.