Ahmadinejad Fails to Appear in Court

Iran’s former president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, failed to appear in court on November 26 to face nine charges levied against him from his time in office.

“The court hearing to discuss the allegations against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was held in Tehran’s 76th penal court branch in his absence. In this session the judicial committee heard the testimony of the plaintiffs,” said Mohsen Eftekhari, Head of Tehran’s Penal Courts.

According to Alef, a conservative website affiliated with a prominent Iranian parliamentarian, the Article 90 Commission is the legal plaintiff and other accusers are individuals.

Article 90 of Iran’s Constitution puts the Parliament in charge of investigating complaints made about the operation of the Parliament, the Executive, and the Judiciary. A parliamentary commission oversees this process.

The cases against the former president include a delay in the operation of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, a failure to carry out the structure of the National Iranian Oil Company, and a failure to allocate the budget for Iran’s metro transport system.

Within the past few days, Ahmadinejad’s supports have been calling for protests in front of the court, but Iranian media has not reported any news of such gatherings.

Ahmadinejad’s bombastic style of governing and his brazen willingness to challenge any opponent created many rifts within the various domestic political factions. The crisis reached its climax when the Supreme Leader considered eliminating the Iranian presidency all together.

The election of Rouhani, a regime moderate backed by reformists, is a welcomed change by the country’s senior officials. 

Zarif Condemns Extremism on His Facebook Page

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, who enjoys more than 620,000 Facebook fans, posted a status on November 20 about his reaction to the recent terrorist attack on his country’s embassy in Beirut. Zarif condemned the attacks by calling for a “fundamental and coordinated” global effort to end extremism.

Reportedly the al-Qaeda-linked Abdullah Azzam Brigades took responsibility for Tuesday’s suicide bombing on the Iranian embassy in Lebanon. The attack killed 25, including an Iranian diplomat, and injured 150 individuals.

Zarif first heard about the incident at an airport in Rome on his way to meet with Italy’s Foreign Minister Emma Bonino. I translated parts of Zarif’s Facebook status below.

“After a two week delay, I succeeded in traveling to Rome for a 3-hour trip. In the Rome airport, I was notified that extremists have conducted a terrorist attack against our embassy in Beirut and have martyred our Cultural Attache and a number of other innocent people. It was necessary for me to have a phone conversation with our country’s ambassador in Beirut. I extend my condolences to him and the family of the martyrs, arranged the necessities for attending to the victims and their families, followed up on the issue, and spoke about preventing the recurrence of similar disasters. I also asked the Arab and African Deputy of the Foreign Ministry who was in Moscow for consultations to immediately go to Beirut and follow up in person. Since yesterday, the majority of countries’ officials have condemned this terrorist act and extended their sympathy to the Iranian people, government, and the families of martyrs. Truly, extremism is a serious threat to all in the region and the entire world. It is necessary to combat it in a fundamental and coordinated fashion globally.”

A Crucial Election for Iran's Reform Movement

You may find my latest article for Jadaliyya below. 

Today, Iranians cast their vote for the country’s eleventh presidential election. It certainly will not be an easy decision, with a field of candidates that lack any sense of major diversity in their policies and ideologies. With one glaring exception, the deck is stacked in favor of the conservative elites.

As any astute student of Iran knows, predicting the outcome of the election is virtually impossible. The only conclusion thus far is that the road has not been kind to the reformists this election cycle. They lost their desired choice of Hashemi Rafsanjani through the qualification process. They were also forced to convince Mohammed Reza Aref, the sole reformist candidate, to withdraw in favor of Hassan Rouhani. Disillusioned by the whole process, some reformists remain jaded about participating in the election.

How Did We Get Here?

The disqualification of Hashemi Rafsanjani stacked the deck in favor of the Supreme Leader and the conservative elites by paving the way for the election of a candidate utterly loyal to the regime. Disqualifying Rafsanjani indicates, once again, that the regime’s inner circle is shrinking and that power is becoming more centralized. But why was the reformist faction counting on Rafsanjani, and why are they currently backing Hassan Rouhani? As long time regime insiders, they can hardly be labeled as reformists. The answer is simple. There is no alternative.

Following the 2009 disputed presidential election in Iran, all major reformist factions were ousted from the political scene and hundreds of reform-minded politicians, activists, and journalists were purged from public life. The 2009 reformist candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, are still under house arrest at unknown locations. Significantly weakened, reformists were left to wonder about their future in a seemingly exclusive regime. Realizing that no major reformist candidate would have a chance of getting through the Guardian Council (the twelve-member conservative body in charge of qualifying all election candidates and thus vetting them), they viewed Rafsanjani’s decision to run as a blessing.

As one of the founding members of the Islamic Republic, and the current chairman of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani presented the best chance for the opposition factions in Iran. His long resume includes influential positions such as the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Speaker of the Parliament, Interior Minister, and the de facto commander-in-chief of the military during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). He is also credited for buttressing Ayatollah Khamenei’s ascendency to Supreme Leadership. The possibility of his disqualification by the ruling conservatives seemed unlikely due to his history and accomplishments.

Divisions within the Reformist Faction

Major divisions permeate the reformist factions regarding whether they should consider not participating in elections in the Islamic Republic. Yet, reformists led by former president Mohammad Khatami announced on 10 June that they will endorse Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric who is also backed by Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rouhani is a member of the Assembly of Experts and the Supreme National Security Council. He has inched closer to the reformists, but more than likely he is vying for popular support and lacks any genuine plans for transforming the system. As a long time member of the country’s Supreme National Security Council and the former chief nuclear negotiator, Rouhani has proven loyal to the ruling establishment and has managed to retain his positions even after the 2009 shake-up. More than likely, anyone expecting him to cross the regime’s redlines will be disappointed.

Once again, reformists find themselves with no alternatives. Presidential candidate Mohammad Reza Aref, former President Khatami’s Minister of Technology, was the sole reformist candidate who dropped out in favor of Rouhani on 10 June. Aref did not have the clout to be a real threat in a race packed with conservative heavyweights. A comment made by Aref best explains the position of reformists who favor participation: “Boycotting the election is not a form of protest, it is retreating.”

Reviving a Movement

By voting for Rouhani, reformists hope to create enough breathing room for the country’s diaspora to reignite the same grassroots activism experienced during Khatami’s presidency. The Supreme Leader may set clear limits, but Rouhani’s moderate tone and pragmatism are appealing when measured against some other candidates. Such an opening may allow the reformist faction to revive the activities of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, a dominant reformist political group, credited for implementing the reformist agenda during Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005). In June 2009, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Saeed Hajarian, and other prominent leaders of the party were arrested and the group was essentially dismantled. Mirdamadi is currently serving the remainder of his six-year sentence in Evin prison.

The release of Mousavi, Karroubi, and other political prisoners such as Mostafa Tajzadeh is another top priority for reformists in favor of participating in the upcoming election. Tajzadeh, a former Political Deputy Minister of Interior, was one of the seven leading reformists who sued several IRGC commanders for their alleged intervention in the 2009 presidential election. By electing a moderate figure such as Rouhani, they hope to reach that goal.

To Participate or Not?

Reformists in Iran are far from united. In a recent statement published on 4 June, the Mujahideen of the Islamic Revolution, a reformist political faction formed in 1991, asked the country’s reformists to boycott the upcoming election and refrain from supporting a candidate. The statement released by the group said, “The upcoming presidential elections should not be viewed as legitimate” and the results will “more than likely be engineered.” The majority of the reformists who signed the statement live abroad.

Ayatollah Mohmmad Mousavi Khoeiniha, an Iranian cleric and the secretary general of the reformist Association of Combatant Clerics, has also voiced his disapproval of the upcoming election. Khoeiniha stated:

I do not believe in election participation under any circumstances. Participation will only harm the reform movement….Election participation should be dignified. Election participation should be within the framework of improving the goals of the reform movement. We should not allow the current ruling faction…to lead us to a dead end.

The reformist group opposing election participation is less clear about its ultimate goals. Given the country’s current intolerant state, they view participation to be superfluous and serving the interests of the ruling conservatives.

What Is Next?

Iranian reformists are not naïve. Even Khatami indicated his doubt about the undemocratic nature of the election in prior months. “Even if we [reformists] are qualified, we will not have the right to get any more votes than what they [ruling conservatives] have already decided,” Khatami stated in a speech to university students in Tehran on 9 May.

The problem for the reformist opposition is not their lack of understanding of the domestic political dynamics or being blindly optimistic about the future. The issue is their inability to reach a consensus about the regime’s ability to reform. The regime has repeatedly cracked down on any meaningful reforms. Amid the height of the reformist era in the 1990s, popular student protests were crushed, prominent reformists were jailed and threatened, hundreds of reformist parliamentary members were banned from reelection in 2004, and hundreds of other reform-minded activists were jailed and threatened in 2009.

The current goal is to get Rouhani elected in order to create space for the reformists. But what if he is not the winner? This is an uncomfortable impasse for reformists. If reforms are no longer possible, then what is the alternative? The Iranian opposition—and perhaps the greater public—is not ready to answer that question yet.

Ahmadinejad's Last Stand

My guest post on The Foreigner:

Iran’s complex bureaucracy is slowly getting ready for another presidential election in June, but thus far the dynamic between the president’s faction and the regime has proven to be far from the ordinary.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s tenure in office will be officially over this summer, however, he may not be ready to go down without a fight. Despite all warnings from regime officials, the president seems adamant about engineering a campaign victory for his right-hand man, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei.

Rahim Mashaei has not officially announced his candidacy, but the campaign seems to be well on its way. Numerous analyses suggest that Ahmadinejad’s faction will not have a chance in the election. More than likely any candidate perceived to be associated with the “deviant faction” – a term used to refer to the president’s supporters and his controversial ally Rahim Mashaei – will be disqualified by the Guardian Council and eliminated from the political arena. So, why is Ahmadinejad still campaigning? And how does the government perceive the intentions of the “deviant faction?”

Shortly after the 2009 presidential election, regime stalwarts began referring to Ahmadinejad and his camp as the deviant faction. The rift began when the president publicly challenged the Supreme Leader over his constitutional right to choose the government’s ministers. The critics believe Ahmadinejad’s brand of politics has deviated from the path of the velayat-e faqih or rule by jurisprudence.

WHAT IS HE THINKING?

Ahmadinejad knows the history of the Islamic Republic well. As evidenced by the fate of his predecessors, Ahmadinejad understands that the regime is not kind to losers. The defeated tend to be marginalized, access to the state controlled media is lost, and at times they are even physically harmed.

Mohammad Khatami and his reformist allies were denied any major national prominence after his presidency ended in 2005. Another president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, was ousted from influential positions, after he called for unity following the 2009 presidential election. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, former regime members and presidential candidates, are still under house arrest at an unknown location.

Given his reputation among the influential regime members, Ahmadinejad recognizes that a dark horizon also awaits him and his camp. So, why stop fighting now?

In Ahmadinejad’s mind, the true test of his legacy will come in the next two months. Ahmadinejad has proven over and over again that he is not willing to go down without a fight and the home stretch is no time to quit. The best-case scenario will be for him to grant a safe passage for Mashaei through the Guardian Council’s vetting process, or at least assure that his faction will survive after he is no longer in office. He may even succeed in rallying the public opinion behind his camp, which may offer some kind of protection after he leaves the office.

The exact next steps of the president’s camp are not clear, but the regime should beware of a man with nothing to lose. The president has demonstrated that he is even willing to play dirty. As displayed on the floor of the parliament during an altercation with the speaker, Ali Larijani, Ahmadinejad is not afraid to publicly disclose sensitive information. In early February, Ahmadinejad challenged Larijani by accusing him of patronage, corruption, and “mafia-like rule.” He went so far as to play a tape of what he claimed was a recording of a conversation between Tehran’s Chief Prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, and Fazel Larijani, the speaker’s brother.

According to the tape, the Larijani family had used its prominence for economic gain. Larijani refuted the relevance of the tape and labeled it as blackmail. This unparalleled public confrontation forced the Supreme Leader issue harsh warnings. Ahmadinejad may have similar evidence and, more than likely, he will use such unorthodox tactics to ensure his longevity until the June presidential elections.

In the meantime, Ahmadinejad is doing all he can to paint himself as a populist president by paying lip service to the public. During his trip to the Khuzestan Province in southwestern Iran on April 22, Ahmadinejad announced, “They have sent a message saying that if I become any bolder, they will try to hurt me. I will fight in the service of justice, revolution, and people…until death. Thousands of Ahmadinejads are not worth as much as a drop of justice or a piece of hair from the head of an Iranian citizen.”

During his trip to Semnan Province on April 11, the president went so far as to throw a jab at the Supreme Leader and the ruling establishment. “Some say that the Leader’s opinion dictates that this person should run and that person should not [campaign]. How is this any of your business? The people should decide. All [political] types should run,” Ahmadinejad announced.

The president’s camp also hosted an event on April 18 at Tehran’s Azadi Stadium. The government had previously announced that the event’s purpose was to “acknowledge the servants of Norouz [the Iranian New Year].” However, critics of Ahmadinejad called it an illegal “election gathering,” because many expected Ahmadinejad to bring his chosen successor, Rahim Mashaei.

The controversial rally was held despite the president’s opponents accusing him of spending public funds for an extravagant gathering with political intentions. According to Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of Keyhan, a conservative newspaper close to the Supreme Leader, $40 million was spent on organizing the event. In an editorial written on April 23, Shariatmadari questioned the genuineness the president’s calls for justice and equality. “$40 million was taken away from the oppressed and disposed people in order to organize an election advertising event for Mr. Mashaei in the Azadi stadium. Is this an example of Mr. president’s justice seeking?”

According to IRNA news agency, nearly 70,000 supporters were in attendance, but the Iranian state media showed footage of almost deserted bleachers. Supporters of the president claimed that the video angles were chosen purposefully to only capture the empty areas, and make the event look like a failure.

THE ESTABLISHMENT’S POINT OF VIEW

Ahmadinejad rarely provides any details about the threats he receives, but it is safe to say that he is being pressured by regime officials to end his uncouth behavior. More than likely traditional conservatives do not view Ahmadinejad as a legitimate political threat to their chances of an election victory. The Guardian Council, the major constitutional body in charge of vetting the candidates, is under their control, so any candidate supported by the president could easily be disqualified. But they still view the president as someone who could further damage their personal reputations and the regime’s legitimacy.

More than once Ahmadinejad has announced that he is willing to publicize confidential records exposing his opponent’s past indiscretions. According to the BBC Persian service, during his visit to the Khuzestan Province, the president once again made his intentions public.

“Some send messages saying that they will confront me because of some of my statements. You are nothing in front of the will of the Iranian nation. This nation has stood up in front of the biggest oppressors; compared to them you [traditional conservatives] are nothing. If only the smallest part of your past behaviors are exposed, you will lose your place among the people,” Ahmadinejad declared. Many influential members of the political establishment have warned Iran’s outgoing president about his bombastic behavior, but to no avail.

On April 12, Ayatollah Momen, an influential member of the Guardian Council, warned Ahmadinejad and his camp by stating, “Don’t have any doubt. If we just sense a little deviation from a [candidate], we will disqualify him.” According to the Young Journalists Club, an Iranian semi-official news agency, Sadeq Larijani, the head of the country’s judicial system, criticized Ahmadinejad’s election efforts, saying “Unfortunately, some activities that are carried out with the government’s budget feel like election campaigns.” He continued by adding that such actions are considered to be a “crime” and the Guardian Council and the Judiciary are closely watching the perpetrators.

On April 23, Major General Hassan Firuzabadi, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, rejected the validity of any threats aimed at Ahmadinejad and advised him to be more measured in his claims. According to Mehr News, a semi-official news agency, Firuzabadi labeled Ahmadinejad’s statements as “unacceptable” and aimed at “disturbing the public opinion.” He added, “Mr. Ahmadinejad should stop making such statements.”

The warnings go on, but the regime is not counting on Ahmadinejad to listen. Security preparations are underway to insure a safe and calm election season. Of course, such moves include but are not limited to just concerns about Ahmadinejad’s deviant faction. Having experienced months of instability following the disputed 2009 presidential election, the regime is not taking any unnecessary risks.

It is difficult to assess Ahmadinejad’s ability or willingness to create the kind unrest seen in 2009. But, in the regime’s point of view, any potential for instability is considered a risk; so it’s always better to be safe than sorry.

In an interview with Mehr News on April 22, Firuzabadi also stated that the Iranian armed forces are “completely ready to confront any potential sedition” in the upcoming June elections. “Our armed forces are highly trained and experienced. They have the experience of the 2009 sedition, so they are familiar with the manner and the details of how to confront any potential dangers.”

On April 19, Iranian Police Chief Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam announced the reimplementation of new “moral and security” measures ahead of the upcoming elections. The move follows an April 16 announcement by Deputy Police Chief Brigadier General Saeed Montazeralmehdi on that an elections headquarters would be created for police to provide security for the elections and monitor anti-regime websites and social media.

The Cultural Ministry also recently announced that all mass text messages sent from election campaigns should be preapproved. According to TELNA, an Iranian information technology website, the spokesperson for ministry stated, “All SMS messages must be sent from traceable and known numbers…the content of such messages will also be controlled.”

In the coming months the battle between the president’s camp and the establishment will intensify. It is impossible to predict Ahmadinejad’s next move, but one thing that is guaranteed is his willingness to fight until the last breath. He does not have that many alternatives. He has to remain aggressive all the way up to the election, since otherwise he risks impending obsoleteness.

Iranian Conservatives Divided Ahead of Parliamentary Elections

My guest post for The Foreigner:

Today’s headlines are dominated by Iran after a plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. was revealed yesterday. Open conflict among the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Iran may not be imminent, but conflict within Iran is ongoing, as conservative factions struggle to form a unified camp and President Ahmadinejad’s party is marginalized even further.

Iran’s maverick president has caused so much acrimony since his disputed re-election in 2009 that the conservatives are more fractured than ever. This fragmentation not only presents obstacles to running the country, but also poses problems for the conservatives as parliamentary elections approach in March 2012.

As the conservatives gear up for the upcoming polls, coalitions and alliances are proving to be more difficult to form than ever. One reason for this was the recent fierce battle between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, which alienated some of the newcomers to the conservative camp. For example, Ahmadinejad’s Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaiee and his supporters were labeled as the “deviant movement” for their unorthodox, and by some standards heretical, views of Shiite theology. Conservative camps had to choose a side. They were either with the Supreme Leader, or with their nonconformist president.

Partisan infighting is not a new phenomenon. The 32-year history of the Islamic Republic consists of complicated and nuanced internal strife between the country’s numerous political factions. Evidently, the reformist years of President Khatami, 1997-2005, and the events following the disputed 2009 presidential election highlighted the distinctions between the reformist and conservative factions of the regime. However, misguidedly, the country’s ruling conservative faction is often painted as a monolithic and unified force. In fact, there are numerous shades of conservatism in Iran, which frequently cause disputes among the ruling clerics.

Case in point was the reaction of the conservatives to the results of the contested 2009 presidential elections. More traditional conservatives, such as Mohsen Rezaei, influential politician and former Revolutionary Guard Commander, went as far as to question the election result, while more radical individuals, such as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, hardliner cleric and a member of the Assembly of Experts, decidedly announced their support for the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Conservative rifts will not have an immediate impact on Iran’s nuclear policy or the country’s general attitude toward the United States. The diversity among the conservatives is related to their ideological and domestic policy differences. As for Iran’s nuclear program, the extreme majority of the conservatives agree with the country’s right to pursue its nuclear ambitions. This is a domestic battle and the winner will attempt to impose his own version of conservatism while in power.

In preparation for the upcoming elections, Iran’s conservative forces have started an inner- party dialogue, which is often backed by public statements indicative of their progress. The conservative forces consist of traditional factions, neo-conservatives, and right-leaning groups.

The Traditional Groups

• Combatant Clergy Association, Jame’e-ye Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez, founded in 1978, plays an important role in deciding the conservative political agenda in the country. The positions by the group tend to be aligned with the government and based on the traditional conservative line of thinking. Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Chairman of the Assembly of Experts and the head of Combatant Clergy Association, has expressed concern about the divisions in the conservative camp, and he is attempting to act as an appeasing force among the different factions.
• Society of the Lecturers of Qom Seminary, Jame’eh-ye Modarresin-e Howzeh-ye Elmiyyeh Qom, founded in 1961, is a conservative group that nominates the lecturers of the Qom seminary who are aligned with the regime. The society is headed by Mohammad Yazdi, Iran’s former Head of Judiciary. More than likely, this group will play the role of an appeaser in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
• The Islamic Coalition Party, Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami, founded in 1962, is traditionally close to Iran’s bazaari merchants. They helped in funding the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran during the 1979 Revolution. They are one of the most powerful and influential conservative coalitions and have strong connections with the non-governmental financial institutions. They tend to lean toward moderate conservatism.
• The Followers of Imam’s Line and the Supreme Leader, Jebhe-ye Peyrovan Khat-e Emam va Rahbari, is a coalition of 14 conservative political groups. Habibollah Asgaroladi is the chairman of this coalition and they tend to function under the umbrella of the the Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami.

Iranian New Conservatives

The participation of three influential figures who comprise the new conservative camp is important to note; Ali Larijani, Chairman of the Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Mayor of Tehran, and Mohsen Rezaie, former IRGC commander and a member of the Expediency Council.

It is difficult to gauge the involvement of these individuals in the upcoming parliamentary elections, but more than likely they will act as influential figures who will set forth the agenda of the conservative party as a whole. The trio does not represent new figures in the Iranian political scene, but their emphasis on liberal economic policies, moderate political ideology, and criticism toward the radical factions has earned them the title of the “new conservatives” in Iran.

Ali Larijani is not part of an official conservative group, but he and his brothers hold key political positions in the system. He is the parliamentary member from Qom, which has made his relationship with the ruling clergy more significant and more influential.As the mayor of the capital, Ghalibaf has proven to be a capable technocrat, managing one of the largest urban areas in the world. He tends to stay away from any political infighting and often uses his newspaper—the Tehran Emrooz—to broadcast his opinions.

Mohsen Rezaie founded the Resistance Front, Jebheye Istadegi, after the 2009 presidential elections in order to analyze the issues facing the conservatives. He is a regular commentator on various media outlets.

The Radical Right

• Esfandiar Rahim Mashaiee, president Ahmadinejad’s closest confidant and his in-law, is the main organizer of support for the president and his faction in the parliament. After the political battle between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, this group has an uncertain future. It is not clear if they will have enough political influence to carry on.
• Society of the Devotees of the Islamic Republic, Jam`iyat-e Isargaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, informally referred to as Isargaran,is a radical right-wing group, which was originally founded by Ahmadinejad. After the president’s scuffle with the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad’s name has been removed from the society’s executive board.The group has focused on highlighting the economic class differences existing in Iranian society. They pander to the impoverished individuals in the public and have been claiming to pursue “justice, simple living, and combating economic corruption.” The executive board consists of 16 individuals, headed by Hossein Fadaie.
• Unwavering Front, Jebheye Paydar, headed by the conservative cleric, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. This coalition has entered the arena to serve as the alliance against candidates supporting Mashaiee. This group does not believe in the political philosophy of the more moderate factions, such as the Combatant Clergy Association and Society of the Lectures of Qom Seminary, and individuals such as Mahdavi Kani.This group has distanced itself from the “deviant movement,” but it still supports Ahmadinejad. It is attempting to make a distinction from the Mashaiee camp and the president.

At a cursory glance the Iranian conservative block might appear to be a unified and cohesive body, but in reality it consists of a number of diverse factions and individuals with different beliefs. Although the internal political struggle does not have an immediate impact on Iran’s posture toward the United States, it has major implications for the future stability and nature of the regime. Understanding the differences between the various conservative groups in Iran can help us form a more complete picture of the ambiguous decision-making process in Iran.