Why Iran’s Reformists are down, but not out

As Iranians head to the polls on July 5 to elect the country’s next president, in my latest analysis for Amwaj.media, I take a closer look at the campaign strategies, rhetoric, and stated plans of the Reformists to explain why the movement is struggling to satisfy its base—the core of which has historically been made up of the white-collar middle class, college students, urban workers, and women who seek greater representation and social freedoms.

Iran held snap presidential elections on June 28, following the May 19 death of Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. After the vote, two leading contenders emerged—Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian and hardliner Saeed Jalili. Neither secured the required majority of votes to declare an outright victory. So, constituents will head to the polls again on July 5 to decide between the two candidates and their widely differing approaches toward social justice, the economy, and foreign policy.

As demonstrated by the record-low turnout of 40% in the first round of voting, the two political camps—particularly the Reformists—did not manage to reignite zeal for change through the ballot box, continuing a downward trend seen in the 2021 presidential and Mar. 2024 parliamentary elections.

Read more…

Reforms Cannot Be Killed

Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s thirteenth presidential election with 61.9 percent of the vote. This is a major victory for the hardliners, but contributing factors such as disarray among reformists need to be better contextualized. I also want to push back on the dominant doom and gloom narrative that is perpetuated in the Western media these days. The Guardian Council ensured Raisi's victory by disqualifying all major reformist and moderate candidates from the get-go, but reformists' agency cannot be discounted. Their disillusionment and lack of a cohesive approach further facilitated the hardliner's victory.

Reformists spent significant time and energy debating the participation issue in an election cycle that was already shortened due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Various consensus building attempts fell short until a few days before the vote, which left little time for mobilization. The increasing gap between the reformists and street-level politics played a major negative role as well. For the past five years, they gradually lost touch with the pressing needs of the middle and lower class Iranians. They backed Rouhani in 2013 and 2017, but they did not have any robust or cohesive response to his shortcomings. Their silence was especially noticeable on issues related to the economy and people's day-to-day livelihood, which significantly regressed after Trump's maximum pressure policy against Iran. The reformists also did not manage to rejuvenate their movement by nurturing a new generation of political leaders, which forced them to fall back on trite tactics and old faces, further disillusioning the voters.

There are other factors involved that will be analyzed for months to come. However, for now, there is a pervasive narrative of doom and gloom that's not situated within the historical realities of Iran. Raisi's victory is certainly a setback for moderate and reformist camps, but it's not predictive of some kind of a political doomsday in Iran. There needs to be a distinction made between the reformists as a political faction and the concept of reforms.

If history is any guide, so far, it's been impossible to kill bottom-up politics and reforms. That's not how state-society dynamics work! There is no permanent destruction of ideas or social forces. Iran is no exception and its history demonstrates it. The country has experienced a rich 100-year timeline of reforms that began with the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and have continued to the present day. This historical arc hasn't been a smooth curve. It's been a jagged line dotted with countless setbacks and state repression. The power and role of various political fronts have ebbed and flowed, but the ability of various bottom-up forces to retain pressure on them as well as the state has also been a permanent feature.

Today was a defeat for reformists, but the struggle is ongoing with many more battles ahead. It may seem impossible now, but Iran's civil society will find alternative ways to retain its pressure on various state bodies and political factions, demanding socipololitical and economic reforms. It seems the reformists have been abandoned by the voters at this moment in time, but this may be the exact wakeup-call needed to alter their approach. If not, the civil society can always find alternatives to communicate its demands and exert its power on the state.

Why Is Rouhani Lashing Out?

The tone of president Hassan Rouhani's measured campaign is changing.  Within recent days, he has delivered rare criticisms of Iran's powerful religious and security forces, lashing out against rivals ahead of his reelection bid in less than 10 days.

To a certain extent, Rouhani’s attacks seem to be even harsher than his 2013 election strategy. For example, he even went as far as stating that the Shrine of Imam Reza—currently managed by Ebrahim Raisi—has avoided paying any taxes. Attacks against holy religious entities are typically considered to be off-limits. The reason behind this sudden shift is due to a number of factors:

1. Rouhani and Jahangiri were caught off-guard during the second debate

During the first debate, Jahangiri was responsible for the brunt of the attacks, mainly levied towards Ghalibaf. Rouhani picked up the pace a bit during the second debate by directly challenging Raisi’s experience, especially when it comes to foreign policy and Iran’s nuclear file. However, it was clear that Jahangiri-Rouhani were not prepared to deflect the majority of the Ghalibaf and Raisi's sharp attacks. For example, Rouhnai's education minister and his daughter were accused of corruption by Ghalibaf, but the moderate duo did not have a convincing rebuttal. Their lackluster performance left the moderate and reformist voices disappointed. They have called for a more robust approach by Rouhani.

2. Influential Conservative Forces Are Throwing Their Weight Behind Raisi

Since the second debate a number of major principlist organizations have officially endorsed Raisi as their candidate of choice. These insinuations have the ability of influencing the hearts and minds of the electorate, especially the country’s religious working class. Some of the major institutions that have publicly endorsed Raisi include the Resistance Front of Islamic Iran, an Iranian principlist political faction associated with Mohsen Rezaee, Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, an influential body currently in charge of promoting or demoting clerical religious ranks, and Combatant Clergy Association, a traditional conservative clerical association.

Additionally, a number of hardline news agencies such as Tasnim, Keyhan, and Fars appear to be inching towards supporting Raisi. Within the past week, they have covered any news related to Raisi's campaign in a more nuanced and comprehensive manner. In order to combat these conservative heavyweights, Rouhani is forced to be much more direct and bold.

3. Furious Protests by Miners Could Indicate Rouhani’s Lack of Popularity within the Working Class

Over the weekend, Rouhani’s convoy faced furious protests by coal miners and their families when he visited the site of an explosion that claimed dozes of lives. Local news agencies broadcasted footage of people that surrounded Rouhani’s car, beating the vehicle and blocking its path. Rouhani’s promise of dealing with the situation did little to calm the crowd.

Just two weeks before the election, such footage could have an impact on public opinion, especially among the country’s blue-collar workers. The visit may have been a shocking revelation for Rouhani who may now believe to be losing popularity within the society's working class. His recent bombastic statements could be an attempt to combat such negative publicity.

It is clear that Rouhani is on full offensive mode and will adopt a no–holds–barred approach prior to the final debate. We should expect a very heated final debate over economic issues.

What Happened During Iran’s First Presidential Debate?

On April 28, Iran's state TV broadcasted the first of three presidential debates, which supposedly focused on social issues. The six candidates, however, were quick to turn the conversation into a heated battle over the country's economic conditions.

The hardline candidate Ebrahim Raisi clearly decided to stay calm and collected during the debate. He avoided any major confrontation with other candidates by sticking to his talking points and not talking out of turn. Regardless of the question, Raisi hammered the key populist policies of alleviating poverty, reducing unemployment, and providing government housing. He reminded the public of his religious devotion and sense of public service, referring to himself as a humble custodian of Imam Reza’s Shrine who has devoted his career to supporting the needy.

Raisi appeared as a sidelined candidate, considering the heated debate between Jahangiri and Ghalibaf that dominated a significant portion of the evening. Raisi also did not come off as a strong orator and spoke in a very calm clerical tone certainly not fit to energize the public.

Raisi has two more opportunities in the following debates to challenge other candidates and better detail his policy proposals. Raisi needs to intensify his rhetoric in order to pander to his hardline base who are expecting a more tenacious stance against Rouhani.

Compared to Raisi, Ghalibaf is a better-known political figure and technocrat with a long history of public service, so he has an established support base. Ghalibaf and Rouhani’s rivalry can also be stretched back to the last presidential debates where they had a number of intense exchanges on live television. Ghalibaf is an articulate and eloquent speaker and very knowledgeable about the nuances of public policy. This makes him a strong presidential contender that does not shy away from a confrontation.

Rouhani and Jahangiri's strategy of sparring with Ghalibaf certainly had an impact on sidelining Raisi. Iranian press has labeled the strategy as the "battle between shadow candidates." Jahangiri and Ghalibaf will do the heavy lifting and take the punches during the debates and will eventually drop out in favor of their faction's lead candidates. This strategy is much more accepted within the reformist camp, however it is still unclear if the conservatives are willing to fully embrace the approach. It is uncertain if Ghalibaf would be willing to eventually step aside in favor of Raisi.

Jahangiri and Rouhani did a much better job at addressing the questions in a more nuanced manner than the other candidates. They demonstrated their policy knowledge and understanding of the specific steps necessary to solve the country's problems.

It is very difficult to assess the impact of the first debate on the working class. Previous populist candidates like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had a tremendous amount of success by appealing to the masses. Issues such as job creation, economic growth, inflation, and battling corruption, which were addressed most often by Raisi and Ghalibaf, remain to be the top priorities for blue collar Iranians.

We should not count Ghalibaf out of the presidential race. Despite Jahangiri and Rouhani’s challenges, he had a strong performance. He is an effective speaker and an experienced technocrat in tune with the country's issues. A number of conservative Iranians on social media actually declared Ghalibaf the winner of the first debate. They appreciated his boldness and tenacity in confronting Rouhani and Jahangiri. Ghalibaf went as far as printing the front page of Rouhani's website during the debate's 15-minute intermission to demonstrate Rouhani’s self-contradictions. He showed the page to the camera in order to prove that Rouhani had promised to create 4 million jobs before his election, a promise Rouhani tried to deny at the beginning of this debate.

Prior to the debate, the moderate and reformist camps were hesitant about their strategy of running a shadow candidate, so it was a pleasant surprise to witness Jahangiri's strong performance. He was willing to ‘take the punch’ for Rouhani in the face of Ghalibaf's tenacious attacks. He also demonstrated a very sharp mind when it comes to recalling statistics to back up his camp's claims. Iranians on social media have dubbed him as the nickname "Super Eshaq." There is a strong assumption that he will drop out of the race after the completion of the third debate. If he does not so, he will harm Rouhani by splitting the reformist-moderate votes.

Why Iran’s Parliament Matters

In my latest piece for LobeLog, I argue that despite what opponents of election participation in authoritarian systems believe, factional political shifts matter in Iran.

“Many opponents of voting in authoritarian systems are quick to dismiss such internal political shifts in Iran as inconsequential given the overall dogmatic nature of the regime. This election cycle was no exception. In the weeks leading up to election day, the proponents and opponents of election participation spilled much ink. Advocates of voting pointed to the importance of civic engagement for the future of reform in the country. Opponents questioned the parliament’s autonomy and criticized its influence. It is not that challenging to dismiss the parliament’s role by simply characterizing it as a tool used by the regime’s elites to preserve some semblance of democracy while they enforce their decrees. However, this view overlooks the position of the parliament as one of the only remaining public arenas for the exercise of factional politics in Iran—a necessary training ground if authentic political parties are to ever take root in the country.”

Read more...

Iran’s Former Reformist President Khatami: I Do Not Want to Return to Power

Iran’s former reformist president, Mohammad Khatami stated that he has no intention of returning to power and politicians from his generation should follow suit.

“I do not have the intention of returning to power…our generation should not return to power again, but we would like to protect [our] values and standards. We will try to promote individuals to power who are most concerned with regime’s aspirations and goals,” Khatami stated.

Khatami spoke during a meeting with the Association of Iranian Political Prisoners Before the Revolution on June 16. Reformist Sharqh newspaper originally published the statements under the headline “Khatami’s Farewell with Power.”

According to Sharqh, Khatami views himself and other reformists as government critics, but emphasizes that they believe in the “foundations of the regime.”

“We have complaints and criticisms, but we believe in the bases of the regime. We do not want our critiques to harm the foundations of the regime. Unfortunately, there are shortsighted views that summarize the regime with a narrow definition. If anyone speaks against [that narrow definition] they say that the regime was weakened. However, a limited view of the regime is what causes the greatest harm,” Khatami stated.

“We all want for [Rouhani’s] government to succeed. This government has a lot of big problems, but it has also done many good things. There are shortcomings, but a big portion of the problems were inherited from the previous administration. So, instead of creating a new arena, the government’s resources have to be spent on fixing old problems,” Khatami elaborated.

Khatami stated that the Revolution belongs to the entire nation and it is the Iranian people who have paid the price thus far. “A single individual or group cannot suggest that they have monopoly over the Revolution, especially groups that neither in theory or practice were affiliated with the Revolution,” Khatami added.

Iranian Conservatives Divided Ahead of Parliamentary Elections

My guest post for The Foreigner:

Today’s headlines are dominated by Iran after a plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. was revealed yesterday. Open conflict among the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Iran may not be imminent, but conflict within Iran is ongoing, as conservative factions struggle to form a unified camp and President Ahmadinejad’s party is marginalized even further.

Iran’s maverick president has caused so much acrimony since his disputed re-election in 2009 that the conservatives are more fractured than ever. This fragmentation not only presents obstacles to running the country, but also poses problems for the conservatives as parliamentary elections approach in March 2012.

As the conservatives gear up for the upcoming polls, coalitions and alliances are proving to be more difficult to form than ever. One reason for this was the recent fierce battle between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, which alienated some of the newcomers to the conservative camp. For example, Ahmadinejad’s Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaiee and his supporters were labeled as the “deviant movement” for their unorthodox, and by some standards heretical, views of Shiite theology. Conservative camps had to choose a side. They were either with the Supreme Leader, or with their nonconformist president.

Partisan infighting is not a new phenomenon. The 32-year history of the Islamic Republic consists of complicated and nuanced internal strife between the country’s numerous political factions. Evidently, the reformist years of President Khatami, 1997-2005, and the events following the disputed 2009 presidential election highlighted the distinctions between the reformist and conservative factions of the regime. However, misguidedly, the country’s ruling conservative faction is often painted as a monolithic and unified force. In fact, there are numerous shades of conservatism in Iran, which frequently cause disputes among the ruling clerics.

Case in point was the reaction of the conservatives to the results of the contested 2009 presidential elections. More traditional conservatives, such as Mohsen Rezaei, influential politician and former Revolutionary Guard Commander, went as far as to question the election result, while more radical individuals, such as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, hardliner cleric and a member of the Assembly of Experts, decidedly announced their support for the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Conservative rifts will not have an immediate impact on Iran’s nuclear policy or the country’s general attitude toward the United States. The diversity among the conservatives is related to their ideological and domestic policy differences. As for Iran’s nuclear program, the extreme majority of the conservatives agree with the country’s right to pursue its nuclear ambitions. This is a domestic battle and the winner will attempt to impose his own version of conservatism while in power.

In preparation for the upcoming elections, Iran’s conservative forces have started an inner- party dialogue, which is often backed by public statements indicative of their progress. The conservative forces consist of traditional factions, neo-conservatives, and right-leaning groups.

The Traditional Groups

• Combatant Clergy Association, Jame’e-ye Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez, founded in 1978, plays an important role in deciding the conservative political agenda in the country. The positions by the group tend to be aligned with the government and based on the traditional conservative line of thinking. Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Chairman of the Assembly of Experts and the head of Combatant Clergy Association, has expressed concern about the divisions in the conservative camp, and he is attempting to act as an appeasing force among the different factions.
• Society of the Lecturers of Qom Seminary, Jame’eh-ye Modarresin-e Howzeh-ye Elmiyyeh Qom, founded in 1961, is a conservative group that nominates the lecturers of the Qom seminary who are aligned with the regime. The society is headed by Mohammad Yazdi, Iran’s former Head of Judiciary. More than likely, this group will play the role of an appeaser in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
• The Islamic Coalition Party, Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami, founded in 1962, is traditionally close to Iran’s bazaari merchants. They helped in funding the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran during the 1979 Revolution. They are one of the most powerful and influential conservative coalitions and have strong connections with the non-governmental financial institutions. They tend to lean toward moderate conservatism.
• The Followers of Imam’s Line and the Supreme Leader, Jebhe-ye Peyrovan Khat-e Emam va Rahbari, is a coalition of 14 conservative political groups. Habibollah Asgaroladi is the chairman of this coalition and they tend to function under the umbrella of the the Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami.

Iranian New Conservatives

The participation of three influential figures who comprise the new conservative camp is important to note; Ali Larijani, Chairman of the Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Mayor of Tehran, and Mohsen Rezaie, former IRGC commander and a member of the Expediency Council.

It is difficult to gauge the involvement of these individuals in the upcoming parliamentary elections, but more than likely they will act as influential figures who will set forth the agenda of the conservative party as a whole. The trio does not represent new figures in the Iranian political scene, but their emphasis on liberal economic policies, moderate political ideology, and criticism toward the radical factions has earned them the title of the “new conservatives” in Iran.

Ali Larijani is not part of an official conservative group, but he and his brothers hold key political positions in the system. He is the parliamentary member from Qom, which has made his relationship with the ruling clergy more significant and more influential.As the mayor of the capital, Ghalibaf has proven to be a capable technocrat, managing one of the largest urban areas in the world. He tends to stay away from any political infighting and often uses his newspaper—the Tehran Emrooz—to broadcast his opinions.

Mohsen Rezaie founded the Resistance Front, Jebheye Istadegi, after the 2009 presidential elections in order to analyze the issues facing the conservatives. He is a regular commentator on various media outlets.

The Radical Right

• Esfandiar Rahim Mashaiee, president Ahmadinejad’s closest confidant and his in-law, is the main organizer of support for the president and his faction in the parliament. After the political battle between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, this group has an uncertain future. It is not clear if they will have enough political influence to carry on.
• Society of the Devotees of the Islamic Republic, Jam`iyat-e Isargaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, informally referred to as Isargaran,is a radical right-wing group, which was originally founded by Ahmadinejad. After the president’s scuffle with the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad’s name has been removed from the society’s executive board.The group has focused on highlighting the economic class differences existing in Iranian society. They pander to the impoverished individuals in the public and have been claiming to pursue “justice, simple living, and combating economic corruption.” The executive board consists of 16 individuals, headed by Hossein Fadaie.
• Unwavering Front, Jebheye Paydar, headed by the conservative cleric, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. This coalition has entered the arena to serve as the alliance against candidates supporting Mashaiee. This group does not believe in the political philosophy of the more moderate factions, such as the Combatant Clergy Association and Society of the Lectures of Qom Seminary, and individuals such as Mahdavi Kani.This group has distanced itself from the “deviant movement,” but it still supports Ahmadinejad. It is attempting to make a distinction from the Mashaiee camp and the president.

At a cursory glance the Iranian conservative block might appear to be a unified and cohesive body, but in reality it consists of a number of diverse factions and individuals with different beliefs. Although the internal political struggle does not have an immediate impact on Iran’s posture toward the United States, it has major implications for the future stability and nature of the regime. Understanding the differences between the various conservative groups in Iran can help us form a more complete picture of the ambiguous decision-making process in Iran.