Hashemi Rafsanjani: There Are No Real Political Parties in Iran

During a speech at the opening ceremony of the fifteenth gathering of the Justice and Freedom Congress of Islamic Iran on April 26, Hashemi Rafsajnai, the Chairman of the Expediency Council, stated that there are no real political parties in the country, but belief in the formation of such entities is prevalent.

“Despite all the trials and errors, we hope to reach a point within our society that would allow political parties to function,” Rafsanajni added.

Formed in 1997 as the Solidarity Association of Followers of Imam’s Path, the organization is the first reformist faction created under the auspices of Khatami’s reformist presidency. Based in Isfahan, the organization changed its name to Justice and Freedom Congress of Islamic Iran in 1999.

“Modern political schools of thought divide political parties based on their executive ideologies on how to run a society – based on people’s votes and the concept of majority rule. They view it as an achievement of modern civilization. However, the reality is that such ideas were formed during the advent of Islam. The Prophet [Muhammad], by relying on the Quran…used the word faction [party] first,” Rafsanjani said.

The Chairman of the Expediency Council stated that Iran’s Constitution has emphasized the importance of party plurality.

“Approved by Ayatollah Khomeini and the people, the constitution clearly emphasizes party diversity, which paved the way for the formation of small and big factions with different opinions. There are no real political parties in Iran, however the belief in party formation is prevalent,” Rafsanjani concluded.

Cleaning House in Tehran

I wrote an opinion piece on President Hassan Rouhani’s struggles with Iran’s precarious economy and its rampant corruption for The Majalla. The piece argues that despite real efforts to tackle its problems, Iran’s economy continues to be the biggest challenge for the new administration.

Despite real efforts to tackle its problems, Iran’s flagging economy continues to be the biggest challenge for President Hassan Rouhani’s government. During his 2013 presidential campaign he promised to resolve the country’s numerous financial issues, but seems to have underestimated the enormity of the task. Today, widespread and systemic corruption continues to plague the country’s financial sector, and a volatile currency exchange market threatens mid- to long-term investments.

Rouhani’s government of “prudence and hope” is fast approaching its one-year anniversary, but many of the economic campaign promises remain unfulfilled. During the June 2013 campaign, Rouhani pledged to focus on fundamental and institutional issues—a message applauded by the electorate. His aim was to reintroduce rational economic policy by welcoming back experts sidelined during the tenure of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the president’s conservative–populist predecessor. Other ambitious promises included the reduction and, eventually, removal of international sanctions, more effective distribution of cash handouts, better liquidity controls, a reduction of inflation, curbing the currency’s volatility, and fighting corruption. Read more…

1414: Shahin Najafi's Melancholy Powerful New Album

Shahin Najafi is a popular Iranian rapper and song writer known for his provoking lyrics that question the social and political norms of the country. As one of the vanguards of the Iranian hip hop scene, Najafi’s songs deal with issues such as poverty, sexism, censorship, child labor, execution, and drug addiction. His songs often consist of strong poetic, literary, and philosophical elements that highlight the various dichotomies between the traditional aspects of the Iranian society and the modern values practiced by the new generation.

The 33-year-old artist’s new album, 1414, consists of four powerful songs that evoke unsettling emotions such as fear, confusion, loss, and longing. The new album is a telling melancholic self-portrait of the artist, but it also expresses the emotional state of many youth in post-revultionary Iran.

Confidential, a track from the album, deals with the state of paranoia experienced in the society due to government censorship and other imposed restrictions. Let’s listen!

What if there is a window behind my cross?
What if there is a mic in my pocket?

What if this SMS gets registered somewhere?
What if my cries over the phone get recorded?

What if they witness our quarrel in the car?
What if they watch you in the shower?

What if he enunciates your name with his mouth?
What if the television broadcasts my secret?

What if he knows something that I know!?
What if the day after tomorrow, I become Keyhan’s top headline?

What if doubt slips into my faithful heart?
What if I give up your name under beatings?

What if they publish my forged letter?
What if all the badness weakens my heart?

I’m bitter and the nightmare of my existence is dissolved in poison
Except you, I’m scared of all people

Everyone, intentionally or unintentionally, is a spy!
Their hands are the noose and they kiss you

I wish at the end of this chilling time, there would be a spring
I wish there was a escape route in your embrace

I wish I could conceal [my] joy from everyone
I wish your love could be tied to freedom

I wish this bad story does not end badly
I wish we sleep again, but for eternity

What if doubt slips into my faithful heart?
What if I give up your name under beatings?

What if they publish my forged letter?
What if all the badness weakens my heart?

Iran's Former Reformist President Cautiously Criticizes Rouhani

Iran’s former reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, delivered his annual Nowruz message via YouTube on Thursday, during which he cautiously criticized the achievements of President Rouhani’s administration thus far.

In his message Khatami highlights that the new government’s promises regarding political and social freedoms have not been fulfilled and that a large gap still exists between the ideals expected by voters and the delivered campaign promises by Iran’s moderate president, Hassan Rouhani.

The video appears to have been produced by the Baran Foundation, an NGO founded by Khatami after his presidential tenure (1997-2005) that mainly focuses on the promotion of social justice and the improvement of welfare programs.

The former president invited the Iranian citizens, especially the youth, to remain hopeful and continue to demand their rights, all while keeping their expectations realistic.

Khatami concluded his remarks with a poem from the beloved fourteenth century Persian poet, Hafez that seems to highlight his message of hope and perseverance.

The Persian text of the speech was published on Baran Foundation’s official website. The translation of the message is provided below.

In the name of God, the most compassionate, the most merciful.

In the name of God who is beautiful and likes beauty.
In the name of God, the most gracious, the most kind.
In the name of the God of spring, the God of human beings, the God of life.
The God who perfects his creation.
The God who wants humans to be alive, dynamic, and sophisticated.
The God who wants a beautiful life for all humans.

The past year, like many years before, consisted of a number of bitter and sweet events. Our nation has consistently tried to get past and tolerate hardships with grace, patience, and a sense for recognizing opportunities. In this manner, we have tried to improve our lives. This past year we witnessed an election that increased the hope in people; an election that should rightly be labeled as political heroism. The creation of a free and safe environment for all groups and factions was what the society expected and demanded. The [election] increased the hope of achieving such dreams. This amazing political achievement [2013 Presidential Election] could have become more glorious if the political environment would have opened up, if the environment of the country had transitioned from a security state to a political one, if political prisoners would have been freed, and if various restrictions and limitations on many individuals had lifted.

Unfortunately, however, such expectations did not come to fruition. Some attempts have been made, but they are not close to ideals. There is still hope for us to create an environment in which hearts are closer to each other. Such an environment would be beneficial for the people, the country, and the regime. It can increase passion and enthusiasm for the country’s development and cooperation in enhancing the state affairs.

We have many issues in many areas. Without a doubt, life is difficult for the majority of our people. Especially for the lower classes of our society, who are significant in numbers. Fortunately, in this regard, the plans and policies of the new administration are good. I hope that various departments and organizations support them. As witnessed, relative openings have been experienced in the foreign policy and economic arenas. However, these openings have to increase. While keeping in mind the national interests of the country, determined and solid steps forward should be taken. The beautiful side of Iran and the divine face of Islam should be demonstrated to the world. Commitment to ensuring the rights and welfare of a nation is a heavy responsibility for the administration and the regime. Of course, by keeping in mind the limitations and the available resources, [people] should keep their expectations at a realistic and logical level. However, we should never lose hope for the future.

Now, I would like to address the dear youth who are the country’s main asset. If there is freedom and prosperity, it is the youth who first experience it, and if there is restriction, unfortunately, it is also the youth who first experience it. But, the youth should never lose hope. They should continue to try. The regime should prepare the environment for the free, active, and enthusiastic presence of the youth in various sectors. All entrepreneurs, laborers, and all who are active should work together to advance the affairs of the country. The esteemed administration should prepare the background for the free presence of all factions, groups, organizations, and the private sector. The administration should utilize all internal and external talents in order to improve the situation. Fortunately, this intention exists and I hope to witness the realization of even bigger steps.

We have hope for the future. We are attached to this land and country. We count on our revolution. We want our regime to be prosperous and proud. In the foundation of this regime, we protect the honor, respect, and dignity of all humans. We hope to witness comprehensive reforms within the regime in the upcoming year–in order to strengthen the regime and to strengthen the foundations of national security and social prosperity. We also hope to witness the building of an environment that allows the use of internal and external recourses for improving the political, economical, and cultural situation of the country.

[…]

I wish for prosperity and happiness for all our dear people and for all who like Iran and Iranians. I hope to God, who has the power to change hearts, who controls the affairs, the God who creates days and nights, and the God who has the power to change all conditions and situations, to change our condition for the better. I hope it happens in a way that we are all happy with our daily lives. I hope that the people and the government step side by side towards a better future.

[Hafez – Ghazal #164]

Morning breeze, its fragrance will exhale
The old world will once again youthfully sail.
Tulip will bring a red cup to the meadows
Narcissus’ eyes from poppy will grow pale.
When would nightingale put up with such abuse
Leave not joy of the now till the morrow
Who can vouch that the morrow, the now shall trail?
Hold dear all the flowers and commune
Came to be and will whither with a breeze or a gale.
This feast is for friends, O minstrel, play and sing
Sing again, it came thus and went thus, to what avail?
Hafez, for your sake, entered this tale
Walk with him, say farewell, he’ll tear the veil

The Unveiling of Iran's Resistance Economy

On February 19, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, called on the three branches of the government to implement the general policies of a decree, dubbed as the resistance economy. The plan encourages indigenous development of new technologies and calls for an increase in oil and gas strategic reserves.

The plan also encourages greater privatization and increased exports of goods and services through administrative reform as well as foreign investment for export purposes.

Some analysts believe that the timing of the decree suggests that the Leader is not optimistic towards the outcome of the ongoing talks, so he is attempting to reduce the country’s vulnerability to external sanctions that may last for the foreseeable future.

Another probability is that Khamenei is hedging his bets. If Rouhani fails to deliver on his promise of easing sanctions through diplomacy or fails to implement his ambitious domestic economic plan, then the Supreme Leader could scuttle the nuclear talks and rely on the resistance economy.

Regardless of the alternate motives behind the decree, the main focus of the plan seems to be on building the country’s domestic capacity, which has been one of the long-term goals of the Islamic Republic.

The full text of the Supreme Leader’s letter and the decree, which you may find below, is well worth a read.

In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

If an Islamic Iran that has abundant spiritual and material resources, a rich and diverse set of talents, a widespread infrastructure, and, most importantly, a committed and proficient manpower that has the determination to advance, subscribes to an indigenous and scientific economic model that projects an Islamic and revolutionary culture, also known as a resistance economy, then not only will every economic problem be overcome, and the enemy, who has waged all-out economic warfare against our great nation, be defeated, but, in a world where risk and dishonesty produces uncontrollable instability in economic, financial, and political matters, we will be able to safeguard our country’s achievements in various fields, continue our progress, fulfill the goals and principles of the constitution and our 30-year visionary plan, and sustain an economy that is reliant on science and technology, is grounded in equality, is endogenous and outward looking, is dynamic and enhancing, and that will be based on an inspiring and objective Islamic economic system.

At the present, we have made the necessary considerations and consultations with the regime’s expediency council so that the policies of a resistance economy, that builds on and continues past policies outlined in Article 44 of the constitution, can strategically move towards fulfilling the excellent objectives that have been mentioned.

It is necessary that the country’s forces proceed in a timely manner to prepare the required laws and plans that will allow the people, and those active in the economy, to take part in this holy jihad so that the divine season for the great nation of Iran’s economic epic, like it’s political epic, can take place for the world to see. We ask the almighty god to give everyone success in this important matter.

Sayyid Ali Khamenei
19 February 2014

Policies of Resistance Economy

To provide dynamic growth, improve the indicators of a resistance economy, and to achieve the goals of the visionary 30-year plan, the policies of a resistance economy with a jihadi, flexible, opportunistic, productive, endogenous, and forward and outward looking approach are as follows:

1. Provide the conditions and opportunities, financial resources, and human and scientific investments in the country to expand and develop entrepreneurship. Expand cooperation between different social actors in the economy by facilitating and promoting collective collaboration; and emphasizing a rise in income for mid- and lower-income populations.

2. Pioneer a knowledge-based economy by implementing a general scientific plan in an innovative systematic manner for the nation in order to promote the nation’s international standing and increase the level of production and manufacturing of goods and knowledge-based services to become the leading regional knowledge-based economy.

3. Prioritize efficiency by strengthening productivity factors, empowering the work force, nurturing competitiveness between provinces, and taking advantage of the capacity and potential of the country’s diverse geography.

4. Utilizing the potential of applying subsidies to increase production and employment, to drastically decrease energy consumption, and improving the indicators of social equality.

5. Improve Total Factor Productivity based on the empowerment of domestic human resources through improving skills education, creativity, and entrepreneurship.

6. Increasing domestic production levels of basic institutions and goods, particularly in imported items; prioritizing the production of goods and strategic services; diversifying the source of supply for basic goods that are imported, with the intention of decreasing reliance are particular countries.

7. Establishing food and medicine security; creating a strategic reserve with an emphasis on increasing the quality and quantity of raw goods and materials.

8. Managing consumption with an emphasis on applying general policies that reform the consumption model and promote the consumption of domestic goods, along with plans to improve the quality and competitiveness of domestically produced goods.

9. Comprehensive reform of the country’s financial system with the intention of responding to the country’s financial requirements; the creation of stability in the country’s finances; pioneering the creation of a real financial sector.

10. All-out targeted support for the production of domestic goods and services, at levels proportional to value-added services that have a positive net-revenue, by way of:

• Simplifying regulations and expanding incentives;
• Expanding foreign services and necessary transportation and infrastructure.
• Encouraging foreign direct investment for exports.
• Adjusting national production according to export demands; creating new markets; diversification of economic ties with other countries, in particular with regional ones.
• Utilization of barter trade systems to simplify exchanges in line with demands.
• Creating stability in the process and regulation of exports, with the intention of expanding Iran’s share of target markets.

11. Expanding free-trade zones and the country’s unique economic activities with the intention of acquiring advanced technologies, and simplifying and expanding production, exporting goods and services, securing export demand and financial resources from abroad.

12.  Increasing the power of resistance and decreasing the country’s vulnerability by:

• Expanding strategic links and cooperation and consultation with regional and international countries, with a focus on neighboring countries.
• Utilization of diplomacy to safeguard economic interests and objectives.
• Utilizing the capabilities of international and regional structures and organizations.

13.  Addressing income vulnerabilities resulting from exporting oil and gas by:

• Choosing strategic customers
• Diversifying methods of sale
• Partnering with the private sector for sales
• Increasing gas exports
• Increasing electricity exports
• Increasing petrochemical exports
• Increasing exports of petroleum products

14.  Increasing the country’s strategic oil and gas reserves with the intention of effecting the international oil and gas markets; emphasizing the safeguarding and expansion of oil and gas production capabilities, particularly in shared fields.

15. Increasing added value by completing the value chain in the oil and gas industries; expanding the production of goods that yield optimal returns (according to an energy intensity index); increasing the export of electricity, petrochemical, and petroleum products, with a focus on conserving resources.

16.  Economizing social expenditures with a focus on fundamentally evolving its foundations, rationalizing the size of government, and disbanding duplicate or unnecessary agencies and departments.

17.  Reforming the government’s system for structuring wages, and increasing tax revenues.

18.  Increasing annual contributions to the National Development Fund from oil and gas exports until it no longer relies on the oil budget.

19.  Encouraging a transparent and healthy economy; preventing an environment that allows for corrupt actions in monetary, commercial, and currency matters.

20.  Nurturing a jihadi culture that brings value, creates wealth, and increases efficiency; promotes entrepreneurship and investments; generates employment opportunities; and that promotes the resistance economy among prominent actors in this field.

21. Explaining the dimensions of a resistance economy and shaping its discussion, particularly in academia and the media; and transforming this into an inclusive and popular national discussion.

22.  The government is obligated to fulfill the general policies of a resistance economy in a synchronized manner that mobilizes the dynamic capabilities of the country; the measures below shall be customary:

• Identifying and utilizing scientific, technical, and economic capacities to achieve appropriate measures.
• Observing sanctions, and increasing the cost to the enemy.
• Managing domestic and international economic risks by responding intelligently, actively, and in a timely manner to them.

23. Transparently and effectively distributing in, setting prices for, and updating the methods for administering the market.

24. Increasing standard coverage and the promotion of domestic products.

Clergys' Role Increases in Iran's Public Schools

Today’s guest author is Saeed Aganji, an Iranian independent journalist, researcher, and former editor-in-chief of the Saba student publication. 

Based on a new agreement between the Ministry of Education and Tehran seminaries, some public schools will start to be managed under the supervision of the seminary. This nascent arrangement has caused a great level of controversy and debate among its opponents and supporters. Many religious organizations have expressed their satisfaction, however, the educators of the country have cried out in protest.

According to the agreement, “Public schools covered under this plan will be rebranded as ‘Seminary Affiliated Schools’ and the management of the school will be permanently transferred to a cleric present on school grounds. Each year more schools will be added following the seminary’s approval.”

A representative of the Council of Cooperation between the Ministry of Education and the seminaries elaborated by stating, “This plan is being implemented in accordance with the Islamic Republic’s regulations and religious edicts. Additionally, [the agreement] aims to enforce foundational change in the education system with the focus of disseminating ideas that result in spreading the ideology of theVelayat-e faqih [Guardianship of the Jurists]…”

The current discourse, which is led by the seminary, is essentially rooted in their desire to maintain their own social status and advance their religious worldview. The intellectual and ideological reasoning of the religious class in Iran, which is generally associated with social, financial, and political advantages, has been damaged due to the overall intellectual and political growth of the Iranian society. If this process continues, the status of the clerical class will continue to deteriorate. This is why they are attempting to delay the inevitable by implementing the aforementioned plan.

The story of clerical involvement in Iran’s education system begins long before the 1979 Revolution. Prior to the advent of the modern education system in Iran all levels of education followed the seminary model and were supervised by clerics. However, beginning in the early 1850s, the first examples of nonreligious, Western-style schools began to operate. This process gradually removed the clerical class from the education system and left them in charge of the seminaries. However, the attempt to take back what was once their domain has continued since this separation. As an example, clerics acted as consultants for the writing of textbooks even before the 1979 Revolution.

Collaboration between the seminaries and nonreligious schools was strengthened after the Revolution due to the strong religious aspects of the ruling regime. In 2006, during Mahmoud Farshidi’s tenure as the Education Minister, this cooperation finally bared practical fruits. During that period the Amin Plan was introduced, which encouraged greater collaboration between seminaries and universities. This plan began its implementation phase in 2009 and ignited great levels of debate in the society. No official data is available on the exact number of universities that are participating in this program.

Furthermore, the background and social foundations of the traditionalist movement in Iran has been based on the pre-modern and pre-capitalist social classes. A substantial portion of the traditionalist class is made up of the clergy. The ideology of the traditionalists is an amalgamation of the ideals of the old aristocratic landowners, the clergy, elites, small shopkeepers, and peasants. Their ideology consists of elements such as social stability, social justice, and emphasizing the hierarchical and patriarchal social and political order.

This traditional movement has two ideological tendencies that are, at times, contradictory. One leaning is the radical egalitarian orientation that expresses petty bourgeois aspirations and the lower traditional classes. The second leaning has a conservative and somewhat elitist orientation. (The former trend was dominant until 1990 and the latter orientation has taken over since.)

In any case, since such groups are always subject to change and prone to collapse, they tend to want to control their own destiny by promoting complete organizational independence. This is one of the main reasons for their discomfort with secular and nonreligious educational centers.

Additionally, the mindset of the traditionalist movement in Iran could be seen in the sense of insecurity, defenselessness, and disunity of this class within today’s society. The clergy class, as the prominent symbol of the traditionalist movement, has always been under a great amount of psychological pressure.

The traditional bonds between the clergy and its supporters have dwindled over time due to the process of modernization and the rebirth of social and political movements. When these traditional ties weaken, a sense of insecurity overcomes the clerics. This sense of future uncertainty, which may result in elimination of their higher social, political, and financial status, causes them to react. Their attempt to penetrate the education system of the country is a means for ideological survival.

Naturally, there is an intense debate happening among the opponents and proponents of this plan. The supporters often argue the following points in defense of their position:

• The students’ religious and theological foundations will be strengthened.
•  The education system will be used to its full capacity to promote the development of all aspects of the students’ lives, which includes spiritual growth.
• Healthy competition will be created between public schools.
• The government’s hegemony over the education system will be reduced.

A quote from an interview with Mohammad Hassan Nabavi, the Public Relations Deputy of the Qom Seminary, sheds some light on other potential reasons for the plan. “The average aptitude of the admitted students to the seminary is low. If we create schools that attract talented individuals, we will encourage students with high aptitude to join such education centers. If implemented correctly, this plan could get rid of the impractical practices of the current system of student submission. We have started our work in high schools and middle schools, but we believe that a comprehensive training process needs to begin from the first day of education. We have to enter the process as early as possible. We believe that such education centers should even start in preschool,” Nabavi stated.

The opposition, which mainly consists of teachers and educators, has been very outspoken. Their reasons can be summarized in the following four points:

• There was a strong emphasis on the independence of the two entities in the previous cooperative agreement between the seminary and the education system. However, the current arrangement undermines the independence of the Education Ministry and it has the potential to break the regulations of this department. Therefore, this agreement is actually illegal. Additionally, this accord ignores the opinion of parents and the preference of students.
• This agreement is indicative if the government’s lack of trust towards the country’s teachers and educators. The seminary’s interference in the education sector and its executive matters will, in a way, create a dual management structure, which will cause a great deal of confusion. The school principle will be receiving his direction from the Education Ministry, while the clergy at the same school receives his orders from the seminary. This dichotomy will only harm the students.
• Placing religious clergy in schools will draw from the Ministry of Education’s resources and will be a costly item in its budget. Particularly since the Ministry already faces financial troubles, there is no need to take on additional costs.
• The continued presence of a spiritual authority with special influence at schools will certainly disturb the organizational and educational procedures already in place. This arrangement will reduce the effectiveness of these education centers.

Such an arrangement has already proven to be ineffective at the university level and it will fail again. Due to their ability to access updated information from across the world, Iranian adolescents are moving away from religious teachings. Compared to previous generations, they have a much less fervent attitude towards religion. The clerics understand the effectiveness of religion as a tool to influence the public, but they are essentially fighting a losing battle with the ever-changing world of information technology and the youth’s insatiable appetite for contemporary knowledge.

Tough Challenges Lie Ahead of Iran Nuclear Deal

The nuclear deal reached between Iran and the P5+1–five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany–is a historic breakthrough and a great step forward, but many domestic and regional obstacles threaten the longevity of this interim agreement.

Hardline factions within Iran are concerned about the potential results of a long-lasting deal that could alter the anti-western nature of the regime, while other countries in the region, such as Israel, find the Islamic Republic’s ambitions to be dubious. Iran’s moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, has to navigate a number of impediments during the next six-month interim agreement in order to set the stage for a potential long-term deal.

The current agreement caps all aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. No new centrifuges will be installed, no new enrichment facilities will open, and activities at the Arak heavy-water production plant will be limited and eventually stopped. Furthermore, daily IAEA inspections at the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities will be allowed, uranium enriched above 5% will be diluted to below 5%, and stocks of 3.5% enriched uranium will not be increased. In return, Iran regains access to nearly $4.2 billion of its frozen assets and will see an easing of restrictions on trade in petrochemical products, precious metals, and parts for aircraft and automobiles. It is estimated that the total financial package will be worth $7 billion to the country’s economy over six months.

EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif along with the foreign ministers of six world powers in Geneva.

This agreement may not be ideal for the West or Iran, but isn’t that the definition of a good compromise? The Islamic Republic freezes its production of 20% enriched uranium and dilutes the current stockpile, easily arguable as a step back from what the country has long labeled as a “heroic national accomplishment.” The West, by agreeing to a 5% enrichment level, tacitly approves of Iran’s right to enrich, a concession that could be costly in the eyes of many hawks.

Nevertheless, the deal is “limited, temporary…and reversible,” which is true in regards to sanctions relief and Iran’s ability to restart its nuclear activities. Six months is a short testing period for each side to examine the other’s commitment– a genuine, and much needed, trust building exercise.

This trial period will not take place in a vacuum. There are many domestic and regional obstacles that could easily derail the process and hamper the development of a long-term deal.            

Domestic Challenges

The major domestic obstacle for president Rouhani’s moderate administration is the opposition of hardline factions. Iran’s radical conservatives fear that any attempt to make peace with their enemy could result in tectonic shifts in the ideological foundations of the regime, which recognizes the western world as enemies of the values preached by the Islamic Republic.

Hours after the details of the nuclear agreement were announced, Keyhan, a conservative Iranian newspaper, published an article discrediting the accomplishment. “The U.S. Was Not Trustworthy: The Geneva Agreement Lasted for One Hour,” read the title of the piece. The editorial criticized the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry by adding that Iran’s right to uranium enrichment was being “violated and denied.”

For the time being, however, criticism seems to be coming from semi-independent conservative factions driven by ideology and a culture of resistance. The country’s senior political elite, including the Supreme Leader, seem to be united in praising the agreement as a victory.

In a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei that summarized the accomplishments of his first 100 days, Rouhani announced that the West acknowledged Iran’s right to enrichment and, as a result, sanctions will be eased.

“Achieving what you have stated is worthy of praise and appreciation of the nuclear team and other practitioners. This could be the basis for other thoughtful initiatives,” Khamenei wrote in his reply.

The interim agreement, as interpreted by Iranian officials, allows the country to enrich up to 5%, provides some much needed economic breathing room by easing sanctions, and reduces the chance of a military strike by Israel. However, as indicated by some of his recent anti-western rhetoric, Ayatollah Khamenei reserves the right to rain on the diplomatic parade if he senses that the ideological and security foundations of the regime are in danger.

Rouhani has been able to keep Khamenei content, and extremist factions at bay, because of his biggest source of political capital–the popular support of millions of Iranians. Rouhani acknowledges the value of popular support–an asset his predecessor lacked–and will do all he can to maintain it.

“Everything we have is because of you. Because of your resistance, your unity, your solidarity, and your unwavering support. The epic [election turnout] on June 14 was your creation. And today, this success is one of the fruits of that epic political presence. The government is proud to have achieved this success within the first 100 days of its administration. God willing, this path will continue with your assistance,”Rouhani announced in his speech to the nation following the nuclear deal.

Regional Challenges

The Iran deal could lead into a more permanent rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran, which is a big cause for concern on the parts of Israel and other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia.

In the eyes of many regional countries, Iran remains a revolutionary country with hegemonic aspirations. Any type of a long-term agreement could perpetuate the Islamic Republic’s ambitions, which may threaten the region. In the eyes of the Saudis, if Iran is no longer spending its resources to combat the United States, then it will be better positioned to dominate the Persian Gulf–a historic rivalry for regional supremacy between the two countries recently intensified due to political instability in Bahrain.

It is also feared that the ongoing negotiations will give Tehran a free hand to expand its support for the Syrian government and other U.S. adversaries throughout the region, such as Hezbollah–a concern for Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries.

Furthermore, Israel still views Iran’s nuclear ambitions as an existential threat. Hours after the agreement was reached between Iran and P5+1, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that “What was concluded in Geneva…is not a historic agreement, it’s a historic mistake.”

As an opponent of the deal, Israel believes the agreement provides Iran with too much freedom to continue with its enrichment efforts, and that it is simply a tactic used by Tehran to buy time. They are suspicious of Iran’s diplomatic rhetoric and believe it to be nothing but a “smiley campaign” launched by Rouhani to fool the western powers.

For the time being, Rouhani seems to have the support of the White House. Obama is discouraging the U.S. Congress from imposing any additional sanctions by highlighting their potential damage to the deal. Israel is not staying quiet and the U.S. Administration is attempting to appease Netanyahu while Iran’s commitment to the deal is tested. Rouhani is battling his opponents at home, while trying to pacify the country’s apprehensive Arab neighbors. The ultimate success of the interim agreement depends on how the U.S. and Iran manage to handle the worthy adversaries of a potential long-term deal.

Rouhani Loves Hiking!

One of the favorite pastimes of Iran’s moderate president is hiking. According to his official website, Rouhani goes hiking once or twice a week at the mountain ranges surrounding Tehran.

“What makes hiking even more enjoyable for the president are the girls, boys, men, and women who start a dialogue with him and share their hopes and dreams,” Rouhani’s website reports.

Here are a few pictures of Rouhani’s hiking adventures.

Iranian Conservatives Divided Ahead of Parliamentary Elections

My guest post for The Foreigner:

Today’s headlines are dominated by Iran after a plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. was revealed yesterday. Open conflict among the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Iran may not be imminent, but conflict within Iran is ongoing, as conservative factions struggle to form a unified camp and President Ahmadinejad’s party is marginalized even further.

Iran’s maverick president has caused so much acrimony since his disputed re-election in 2009 that the conservatives are more fractured than ever. This fragmentation not only presents obstacles to running the country, but also poses problems for the conservatives as parliamentary elections approach in March 2012.

As the conservatives gear up for the upcoming polls, coalitions and alliances are proving to be more difficult to form than ever. One reason for this was the recent fierce battle between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, which alienated some of the newcomers to the conservative camp. For example, Ahmadinejad’s Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaiee and his supporters were labeled as the “deviant movement” for their unorthodox, and by some standards heretical, views of Shiite theology. Conservative camps had to choose a side. They were either with the Supreme Leader, or with their nonconformist president.

Partisan infighting is not a new phenomenon. The 32-year history of the Islamic Republic consists of complicated and nuanced internal strife between the country’s numerous political factions. Evidently, the reformist years of President Khatami, 1997-2005, and the events following the disputed 2009 presidential election highlighted the distinctions between the reformist and conservative factions of the regime. However, misguidedly, the country’s ruling conservative faction is often painted as a monolithic and unified force. In fact, there are numerous shades of conservatism in Iran, which frequently cause disputes among the ruling clerics.

Case in point was the reaction of the conservatives to the results of the contested 2009 presidential elections. More traditional conservatives, such as Mohsen Rezaei, influential politician and former Revolutionary Guard Commander, went as far as to question the election result, while more radical individuals, such as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, hardliner cleric and a member of the Assembly of Experts, decidedly announced their support for the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Conservative rifts will not have an immediate impact on Iran’s nuclear policy or the country’s general attitude toward the United States. The diversity among the conservatives is related to their ideological and domestic policy differences. As for Iran’s nuclear program, the extreme majority of the conservatives agree with the country’s right to pursue its nuclear ambitions. This is a domestic battle and the winner will attempt to impose his own version of conservatism while in power.

In preparation for the upcoming elections, Iran’s conservative forces have started an inner- party dialogue, which is often backed by public statements indicative of their progress. The conservative forces consist of traditional factions, neo-conservatives, and right-leaning groups.

The Traditional Groups

• Combatant Clergy Association, Jame’e-ye Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez, founded in 1978, plays an important role in deciding the conservative political agenda in the country. The positions by the group tend to be aligned with the government and based on the traditional conservative line of thinking. Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Chairman of the Assembly of Experts and the head of Combatant Clergy Association, has expressed concern about the divisions in the conservative camp, and he is attempting to act as an appeasing force among the different factions.
• Society of the Lecturers of Qom Seminary, Jame’eh-ye Modarresin-e Howzeh-ye Elmiyyeh Qom, founded in 1961, is a conservative group that nominates the lecturers of the Qom seminary who are aligned with the regime. The society is headed by Mohammad Yazdi, Iran’s former Head of Judiciary. More than likely, this group will play the role of an appeaser in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
• The Islamic Coalition Party, Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami, founded in 1962, is traditionally close to Iran’s bazaari merchants. They helped in funding the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran during the 1979 Revolution. They are one of the most powerful and influential conservative coalitions and have strong connections with the non-governmental financial institutions. They tend to lean toward moderate conservatism.
• The Followers of Imam’s Line and the Supreme Leader, Jebhe-ye Peyrovan Khat-e Emam va Rahbari, is a coalition of 14 conservative political groups. Habibollah Asgaroladi is the chairman of this coalition and they tend to function under the umbrella of the the Hezb-e Motalefeh-ye Eslami.

Iranian New Conservatives

The participation of three influential figures who comprise the new conservative camp is important to note; Ali Larijani, Chairman of the Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Mayor of Tehran, and Mohsen Rezaie, former IRGC commander and a member of the Expediency Council.

It is difficult to gauge the involvement of these individuals in the upcoming parliamentary elections, but more than likely they will act as influential figures who will set forth the agenda of the conservative party as a whole. The trio does not represent new figures in the Iranian political scene, but their emphasis on liberal economic policies, moderate political ideology, and criticism toward the radical factions has earned them the title of the “new conservatives” in Iran.

Ali Larijani is not part of an official conservative group, but he and his brothers hold key political positions in the system. He is the parliamentary member from Qom, which has made his relationship with the ruling clergy more significant and more influential.As the mayor of the capital, Ghalibaf has proven to be a capable technocrat, managing one of the largest urban areas in the world. He tends to stay away from any political infighting and often uses his newspaper—the Tehran Emrooz—to broadcast his opinions.

Mohsen Rezaie founded the Resistance Front, Jebheye Istadegi, after the 2009 presidential elections in order to analyze the issues facing the conservatives. He is a regular commentator on various media outlets.

The Radical Right

• Esfandiar Rahim Mashaiee, president Ahmadinejad’s closest confidant and his in-law, is the main organizer of support for the president and his faction in the parliament. After the political battle between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, this group has an uncertain future. It is not clear if they will have enough political influence to carry on.
• Society of the Devotees of the Islamic Republic, Jam`iyat-e Isargaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, informally referred to as Isargaran,is a radical right-wing group, which was originally founded by Ahmadinejad. After the president’s scuffle with the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad’s name has been removed from the society’s executive board.The group has focused on highlighting the economic class differences existing in Iranian society. They pander to the impoverished individuals in the public and have been claiming to pursue “justice, simple living, and combating economic corruption.” The executive board consists of 16 individuals, headed by Hossein Fadaie.
• Unwavering Front, Jebheye Paydar, headed by the conservative cleric, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. This coalition has entered the arena to serve as the alliance against candidates supporting Mashaiee. This group does not believe in the political philosophy of the more moderate factions, such as the Combatant Clergy Association and Society of the Lectures of Qom Seminary, and individuals such as Mahdavi Kani.This group has distanced itself from the “deviant movement,” but it still supports Ahmadinejad. It is attempting to make a distinction from the Mashaiee camp and the president.

At a cursory glance the Iranian conservative block might appear to be a unified and cohesive body, but in reality it consists of a number of diverse factions and individuals with different beliefs. Although the internal political struggle does not have an immediate impact on Iran’s posture toward the United States, it has major implications for the future stability and nature of the regime. Understanding the differences between the various conservative groups in Iran can help us form a more complete picture of the ambiguous decision-making process in Iran.